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Bilateral investment treaties are agreements between sovereign states that give
broad protections to investors and investments made within the jurisdiction of
the other state. The prevailing view in the academy and practice is that
developing countries sign bilateral investment treaties in order to reassure
investors from developed states that their investments will be safe from changes
in domestic law. Without these "credible commitments, " investors would be
deterred from making investments, depriving developing countries of foreign
capital. This Article disputes that view by demonstrating that foreign investors
and host states effectively contract around the risk of changes in the law. This
Article applies transaction cost economic theory to the most comprehensive
empirical study of stabilization clauses (provisions intended to manage post-
investment changes in domestic law) recently conducted under the auspices of
the World Bank's International Finance Corporation. The analysis shows that
investors and states demonstrate principles of efficient contracting even without
the protections of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This finding adds to
current research focusing on the "credible commitment" story. The Article
concludes that (1) BITs can be explained as instruments developed and
developing states use in their competition for markets and capital and (2)
diferences in the reasons states execute BITs raise significant doubts about
conclusions drawn based on aggregate phenomena.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the late
1980s and early 1990s generated robust debate on whether these treaties
actually advance their presumed goal of increasing and protecting foreign
direct investment in developing countries or whether they represent an
economically unjustified benefit to business entities incorporated in capital
exporting countries. BITs are treaties signed between two sovereign states
that give private investors certain protections for investments made in the
other state. The substantial majority of BITs are signed between one
developed state and one developing state. The parties generally agree to
refer disputes over their promises to international arbitration for resolution.
Advocates and scholars criticize both the economic rationale behind BITs
and their effects on developing countries. First, they question whether BITs
increase investment in developing states; second, they argue BITs
undermine the legitimate regulatory authority of the state; finally, they
allege BITs feed an international arbitration industry that, at best, lacks
transparency and, at worst, issues inconsistent decisions shaped by
conflicting motives.' Recent scholarship has attempted to identify a pro-
investment "mythology" of BITs, attacking that mythology as lacking
empirical and logical coherence.2
This Article offers an efficiency rationale for the rejection of BITs in
'See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards
Principles of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with
Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 451 (2008); William W. Burke-White & Andreas
von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and
Application ofNon-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA.
J. INT'L L. 307 (2008); Gus Van Harten, Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A
Critical Discussion, 2(1) TRADE L. & DEV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 19 (2010). For an example of
the final critique, see Luke Eric Peterson, Philip Morris Files First-Known Investment Treaty
Claim Against Tobacco Regulations, INv. ARB. REP. (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.iareporter.
com/articles/20100303 (describing how two Swiss-incorporated entities of Philip Morris
International used the 1991 Swiss-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty to initiate arbitration
against Uruguay for implementing regulations that were (1) consistent with obligations
under the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and (2)
anchored in the interest of protecting the health of its citizens. See also Agreement on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Switz.-Uru., Oct. 7, 1988, 1976
U.N.T.S. 389. See also Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory
State, 109 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16 (2010), http://www.niichiganlawreview.org/
assets/fi/109/piety.pdf (reviewing the bases for regulation of tobacco packaging and
labeling). PMI's challenge is particularly brazen since the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control is an evidence-based treaty and the vagaries that often accompany
determination of optimal regulation regimes are minimal. See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory
Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 252 (2010) (listing the
various factors than can complicate calculations of optimal regulatory regimes).
2 See Van Harten, supra note 1; Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the
Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405, 408 (2008)
[hereinafter Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties].
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favor of direct negotiation between foreign investors and host states. In
many cases, BITs are unnecessary; under some circumstances, they may
undermine efficient contracting. My argument relies in significant part on
the framework developed by Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson on the
"theory of the firm," which argues that boundedly rational, opportunistic
parties will adopt one of several alternative institutions that maximize
transaction gains while minimizing transaction costs.4 This Article applies
these insights to a recent comprehensive study of contracting behavior
between states and foreign investors. The study shows these parties ensure
commitments to each other with a variety of contractual mechanisms that
efficiently distribute the risks of changes in local law.
The principal purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that investors
and host states, by and large, effectively construct conflict-resolving
institutions without the "credible commitments" 5  BITs purportedly
The permutations, classifications and categorizations of "theories of the firm" reveal
very little consistency in the literature, but most credit Coase and Williamson with the key
historical development. See Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the
Firm, in ORGANIZATION THEORY 154 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990) (identifying the
"neoclassical theory," "principal-agent theory," "transaction cost economic theory," "nexus
of contracts theory," and "property rights theory"). Many scholars argue that the view that
firms are mostly one of many institutions governing transaction costs is too narrow. See
Richard Langlois, The Boundaries of the Firm, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN
ECONOMICS 175 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994) (classifying the "transaction cost theory" and
the "nexus of contracts theory" both as "transaction cost theories" focusing on different
transactions); Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOzo L. REV. 1459, 1464-65
(2005) (suggesting that all of the authors otherwise distinguished above present no positive
theory of the firm, in its internal workings, but varying themes of resource allocation); Jack
High, The Market Process: An Austrian View, in THE MARKET PROCESS 20 (Peter J. Boettke
& David L. Prychitko eds., 1994).
4 While Coase and Williamson focused on the business entity, the principles of efficient
contracting they articulated are applied widely. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and
Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101 (1997) (explaining how, in its most
advanced form, a firm demonstrates many characteristics typical of a social (as opposed to a
contracting) institution)); see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An
Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics and Deep
Capture, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 198 (2004). The critical literature is similarly large,
targeting in particular asymmetries in information. The growing body of literature on
information asymmetries pioneered by Akerlof, Stiglitz and Spence, among others, has made
significant gains in addressing some of the problems arising from assigning mutually
uniform characteristics to contracting parties. There remains robust debate about the extent
these insights play versus the corrective functioning of the market. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The
Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q. J.
EcoN. 1441, 1441-78 (2000); George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); Frederick C. v. N.
Fourie, In the Beginning There Were Markets?, in TRANSACTION COSTS, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES 46 (Christos Pitelis ed., 1993).
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 659 (1998) ("The central
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provide.6 The article relies on a recent empirical study of "stabilization
clauses" in agreements between foreign investors and host states.
Stabilization clauses are provisions in individual investment contracts that
govern how, if at all, laws enacted post-investment will apply to the
investor or investment. This study, coordinated between the World Bank's
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the U.N. Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights
(UN Special Representative), obtained seventy-six current investment
contracts and twelve model investment contracts. The data gleaned from
these contracts support predictions generated under the Coase-Williamson
framework: parties will adopt stronger institutional protections as the object
of the contract increases in mutual importance.
A secondary argument is that, in some circumstances, BITs may
undermine efficient contracting between foreign investors and host states.7
Because the terms of BITs are broader and generally lopsided in favor of
the investor, an investor may choose to rely on the provisions of the BIT
instead of a stabilization clause. Even where a stabilization clause is
negotiated between the parties, a foreign investor may (1) ex post,
incorporate a holding company in a jurisdiction that will give it greater
protections under a BIT than the stabilization clause,' or (2) if a dispute
arises, use the most-favored-nation clauses in BITs to argue the most
favorable BIT to which the host state is a party represents the applicable
problem is that a sovereign state is not able, absent a BIT, to credibly bind itself to a
particular set of legal rules when it negotiates with a potential investor.").
6 This would be true even if developing countries did not bargain collectively. See id. at
643. See also Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to
the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 477 (2009)
("Conversely, from the host state's perspective, the investor's right to initiate arbitration
enables the host state to make credible the commitments it made under its investment
treaties. This, in turn, reduces the political risk of foreign investment, lowers the risk
premium connected to it, and therefore makes investment projects more cost-efficient.");
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 621, 638 (1993) [hereinafter US. Bilateral Investment Treaties].
See Derek S. Pugh, Does Context Determine Form?, in ORGANIZATION THEORY 16
(Derek S. Pugh ed., 1997).
See Robert T. Greig, Claudia Annacker & Roland Ziade, How Bilateral Investment
Treaties Can Protect Foreign Investors in the Arab World or Arab Investors Abroad, 25 J.
INT'L ARB. 257, 272 (2008); Prabhash Ranjan, Definition of Investment in Bilateral
Investment Treaties of South Asian Countries and Regulatory Discretion, 26 J. INT'L ARB.
217, 221 (2009) (citing Fedax v. Venezuela, July 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998) in which
holders of promissory notes who were not entitled to investment protection transferred the
notes to a Dutch company which then availed itself of treaty protection). When Philip
Morris International became a Swiss company in 2007, it did so for "regulatory, overseas"
operations but it has also made extensive use of Switzerland's vast network of BITs. Altria
to Spin Off Philip Morris International, MSNBC.com, Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/20494757/ ("The spin-off would clear the international tobacco business from
the legal and regulatory constraints facing its domestic counterpart, Philip Morris USA.").
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law.9 BITs may, in fact, reduce or eliminate alternative institutional
possibilities investors and host states might use in the event a host state
changes its law in a manner affecting the value of the investment.' 0
This thesis adds an important dimension to the prevailing theory which
asserts that capital importing or developing countries sign BITs as part of
an effort to encourage or reassure investors." While this explanation might
account for some decisions to sign BITs, there is evidence to show that
developed or capital exporting countries also compete-not only for access
to new or emerging markets, but also to attract (or retain) domiciliary
investors.12 Foreign policy objectives also complicate the competition for
global capital. It is often unclear whether the desire to promote and protect
foreign investment drives political and diplomatic calculations or vice
versa.'3
9 This possibility, in effect, adds a second layer of contracting inefficiency. The
stabilization clause is undermined by the BIT governing the relationship between the foreign
investor's home state and the host state. The BIT is undermined by the most-favored-nation
clause which renders any given provision of the BIT subject to the most favorable procedural
or substantive treatment in any other BIT the host state has with any other home state. See
Yannick Radi, The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute
Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the 'Trojan Horse',
18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 757 (2007).
10 This calculation would be shaped by analysis of how international arbitration tribunals
use stabilization clauses. Certainly it is possible, indeed it is probable, that a tribunal would
use some aspect of the BIT to obtain jurisdiction and then apply the terms of the stabilization
clause in calculating damages. The stabilization clause would, in effect, provide specificity
where the BIT does not. Indeed, at least one tribunal has required a stabilization clause as a
precondition of issuing an award for an indirect expropriation. Parkerings-Compagneit AS
v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, (Sept. 11, 2007), 2007 WL
5366481 332 (2007) ("Save for the existence of an agreement in the form of a stabilisation
clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the amendment brought to the
regulatory framework existing at the time the investor made its investment."). Nevertheless,
it is asserted that under some conditions, an investor may determine that the broader terms of
the BIT may provide a better chance of obtaining a larger award for an "indirect
expropriation."
" Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811, 813 (2006).
12 Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 509 n.130 ("One of the often cited examples is Aguas del
Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia. Bechtel the U.S. parent company of Aguas del Tunari, S.A.,
established a post office in the Netherlands, so that the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) could have jurisdiction. See SARAH ANDERSON & SARA
GRUSKY, CHALLENGING CORPORATE INVESTOR RULE 18 (Inst. for Pol'y Studies & Food &
Water Watch 2007). More telling, two of the three arbitrators at ICSID seemingly were
enthusiastic about Bechtel's strategy describing BITs as "portals" through which investors
from a multitude of countries might choose to make onward investments into the developing
world, and thereby enjoy the treaty protections. See IISD, Tribunal Split in Bechtel-Bolivia
Case Over Corporate Nationality of Investor, Inv. Treaty News (Dec. 20, 2006),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/itndec20_2005.pdf (summarizing the tribunal's two-to-one
ruling dismissing all of Bolivia's jurisdictional objections).
13 HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (1977); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF
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To the extent that principles of efficient contracting, as articulated by
Coase and Williamson, might improve both the BIT negotiating process and
the overall regime of BITs, it is worth providing a sustained treatment of
the topic to do so.14 Even if the proliferation of BITs displaces foreign
investor-host state contracting, it may be possible to apply lessons learned
from investor-state negotiations to BIT negotiations which are often one-
sided and tend to allocate greater risk to the host state and its citizens.'5
While some scholars have explored the extent to which BITs duplicate
protections provided in investment contracts, the literature is lacking (1)
evidence to support the basic claim that contracting may provide a complete
alternative to BITs and (2) a sustained analysis of whether foreign
investment decisions closely approximate the same contracting principles
that enjoy empirical support in the domestic context.
This paper is organized as follows: Part II of this Article provides a
brief history of bilateral investment treaties. Part III explains the Coase-
Williamson framework for analyzing efficient contracting and predicting
the development of conflict-reducing institutions. Part IV comprehensively
analyzes the study of investment agreement stabilization clauses conducted
by Andrea Shemberg under the auspices of the IFC and the UN Special
Representative. The analysis will support the views that (1) prior to the
proliferation of BITs, investors contracted with host governments around
political risks using a variety of conflict-reducing institutions, (2) the
complexity of these institutions by and large reflected the probability that
one or both parties would act opportunistically (low probability
corresponding to relatively simple dispute resolution mechanisms), and (3)
the proliferation of BITs may undermine investment-specific arrangements.
In Part V, I argue the view of BITs as "credible commitments" from
developing countries toward investors in developed countries is too narrow.
BITs are one of many instruments available to states to accomplish
interrelated economic and political objectives. The literature, therefore, is
skewed in at least two directions: first, it over-emphasizes competition
between developing, as opposed to developed, countries; second, it tends to
assume uniformity in the objectives behind BITs.
II. HISTORY AND PROLIFERATION OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES
A. Political Risk
A foreign investor will endeavor to minimize at least the following
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
14 See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND
WHY IT MATTERS 112-70, 189-244 (2000).
15 Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1999).
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risks after making the decision to invest: commercial risk (prices for a
commodity or good may drift above or below estimates), financial risk
(interest rates may rise or fall beyond an anticipated range), natural
disasters, and political risk-the risk a change in law will diminish the
value of the investment. 16  Political risk in this context describes the
incentives host governments have to pass laws or regulations that extract
greater value from a project or investment after the investor has sunk
significant costs building facilities, obtaining labor, and establishing
requisite conditions.'" Historically, foreign investors worried about
nationalization per se; now, their concerns are focused on less sweeping
but nevertheless costlyenvironmental, health, labor, and tax changes. To
reduce this risk, investors might rely on the ability to petition their home
governments to act on their behalf; to conclude agreements that give them
expanded rights vis-A-vis host states; and to negotiate contractual provisions
directly with host governments. An investor may also reduce political risk
by procuring insurance or engaging in a joint venture, enabling it
simultaneously to limit its exposure and increase the number of parties that
can pressure a government that passes an unfavorable law or regulation.
B. Diplomatic Protection for Foreign Investors
In the event a host government violates customary international law,
causing a breach of contract, or direct or indirect expropriation, an investor
may have access to the diplomatic protections of its home government.18 A
state is liable under customary international law where (1) it breaches a
contract with an alien investor and (2) that breach was caused by
discriminatory or arbitrary conduct.19 Furthermore, a state may take action
against another state for direct or indirect expropriation where the host state
"impairs the value of an investment through unilateral interference with a
16 Margarita T.B. Coale, Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Transactions,
30 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 217, 220 (2002). Here, "political risk" means primarily legal
risks like regulatory change, although it might mean more catastrophic events like a civil
war.
1 Thomas Wlelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and
'Regulatory Taking'in International Law, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 811, 819 (2001).
18 See Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of
Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 478-81 (2008) ("Under customary
international law, governmental and private actors are free to agree upon the point at which
government regulation will constitute indirect expropriation, as well as the consequences of
that determination for compensation."). The standard for indirect expropriation under
customary international law is high. Michael G. Parisi, Comment, Moving Toward
Transparency? An Examination of Regulatory Takings in International Law, 19 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 383, 394 (2005) ("International courts and tribunals have stressed that the
'obligation to compensate does not extend to regulations imposed pursuant to the exercise of
legitimate government police powers, such as taxation and protection of human health and
welfare.").
19 Id.
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contract by legislative or administrative means" and fails to "properly
compensate" the investor.2 o In either event, the home state acts when the
customary and legitimate expectations its citizens enjoy when visiting a
foreign but friendly territory have been violated, and it asserts those rights
as a sovereign. 2 1 Practically, however, the process of this ex post effort at
compensation is slow and deeply influenced by surrounding political
considerations.
Before the modem regime of international investment arbitration,
investors often were required to exhaust the domestic courts of the host
country before receiving diplomatic assistance.22 Although empirical
studies are inconclusive on the issue, investors perceived these courts as
inhospitable, and they sought other forums to resolve investor-state
23disputes. As recently as 1998, states tried to address this problem with
broad, multilateral investment agreements.24 These attempts failed for
several reasons, including intractable differences between developed and
developing countries and, with the proposed Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI), the extraordinary mobilization of civil society groups
arguing the MAI would disproportionately disadvantage developing
25
countries.
20 Laura Henry, Investment Agreement Claims under the 2004 Model US. BIT: A
Challenge for State Police Powers?, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 935, 955 (2010) (citing IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 553 (5th ed. 1998)).
21 JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 109-11, 373 (2010).
22 See Brower & Schill, supra note 6, at 480-81; Valentin Jentsch, The Role of Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs) in Switzerland: Importance and Alternatives from an
Entrepreneurial Perspective 5 (Univ. of St. Gallen Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-
02, 2009).
23 LuCy REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 3 (2d ed. 2006); Van Harten, supra
note 1, at 33-34.
24 Aron Broches, The Experience ofthe International Centrefor Settlement ofInvestment
Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: AVOIDANCE AND SETTLEMENT 75, 76
(Seymour J. Rubin & Richard W. Nelson eds., 1985); Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of
the Umbrella Clause in the International Law ofInvestment Protection, 20 ARB. INT'L 411,
427 (2004) (discussing the 1962 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property).
25 These differences included the appropriate standard of compensation and the types of
property eligible for protection. See KATIA TIELEMANN, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE,
THE FAILURE OF THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAI) AND THE ABSENCE
OF A GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY NETWORK (1999), http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/
TielemanMAI GPPNetwork.pdf. For an interesting look at a smaller, more focused,
example of a multilateral investment agreement, see Andrei Konoplyanik & Thomas
Wdelde, Energy Charter Treaty and its Role in International Energy, 24 J. OF ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 523 (2006) (describing the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which protects
foreign investments in energy projects and facilitates transit of energy resources). The ECT
served as the basis for one claim challenging Kyoto-related regulations on coal-energy
production. Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v.
Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6.
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C. Contractual Protection for Investors
Because of the unreliability of diplomatic protections, investors often
used agreements with host governments to manage political risk.26 In long-
term contracts, investors included clauses that sought to render new laws
affecting the investment's value inapplicable to the investment. Generally
referred to as stabilization clauses, parties drafted these provisions to
explicitly cover political risk. For example, a stabilization clause might
provide that:
the GOVERNMENT hereby undertakes and affirms that at no time
shall the rights (and the full and peaceful enjoyment thereof) granted
by it under this Agreement be derogated from or otherwise
prejudiced by any Law or by the action or inaction of the
GOVERNMENT, or any official thereof, or any other Person whose
actions or inactions are subject to the control of the
GOVERNMENT. In particular, any modifications that could be
made in the future to the law as [i]n effect on the Effective Date shall
not apply to the CONCESSIONAIRE and its Associates without
their prior written consent, but the CONCESSIONAIRE and its
Associates may at any time elect to be governed by the legal and
regulatory provisions resulting from changes made at any time in the
Law as in effect on the Effective Date.2 7
While some legal scholars predicted the demise of these provisions
during the wave of nationalizations in the 1950s and 1960s, foreign
investors and states continued to use them.28
Stabilization clauses manage political risk through a wide range of
strategies. They may freeze both fiscal and non-fiscal law with respect to
an investment, specify a given set of issue areas that are frozen, require
compensation in the event of any change in the law, require limited
compensation or compensation over a given threshold after a change in the
law, carve out exemptions from certain laws, or protect against financial
loss on account of a limited set of changes in the law.29 The complexity,
26 Frederick Alexander Mann, The Aminoil Arbitration, in FURTHER STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 252,252-54 (Frederick Alexander Mann ed., 1990).
27 Andrea Shemberg, Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights (Mar. 11, 2008),
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsflAttachmentsByTitle/pStabilizationClausesandHumanR
ights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf.
28 Id. See also Thomas W. Wdelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215,
224 (1996); Lorenzo Cotula, Reconciling Regulatory Stability and Evolution of
Environmental Standards in Investment Contracts: Towards a Rethink of Stabilization
Clauses, 1 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 158 (2008). Both Waelde and Ndi and Cotula refer
to a perception that the use of stabilization clauses declined in the 1970s and 1980s, but
those claims appear to have more to do with their relative prominence in the academic
literature as opposed to actual use by investors and states.
29 These represent only a few of the alternatives negotiated by parties. Shemberg, supra
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diversity, and history of stabilization clauses play an important evidentiary
role in the argument presented here.
D. BITs: The Convergence of Diplomatic and Contractual Protections
Bilateral investment treaties combine aspects of diplomatic and
contractual protections for investors. 30  Generally, BITs are negotiated
between capital-exporting nations (developed or home states) and capital-
importing nations (developing or host states), although BITs are
increasingly executed between two developing countries.3 ' BITs contain
provisions guaranteeing investors from the home state protections for their
"investments" in the host state. These guarantees may include fair and
equitable or non-discriminatory treatment,32 free transfer of profits and
currency, and, in many cases, payment of compensation should a host state
adopt measures having the effect of direct or indirect expropriation.33 BITs
do not, typically, include enumerated rights for host states outside their
ability to prohibit certain economic activities altogether or to take normal
regulatory action in the interest of public order, public health or public
morality-so-called "non-precluded measures."3 4 Host states are still
potential obligated to compensate investors for these "regulatory
takings." 5 Most of these treaties provide investors access to one of the
major international arbitral tribunals to vindicate rights under a BIT. BITs
often provide for arbitration at the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) because it is perceived to move quickly 36 and
to issue decisions less prone to appeal or unenforceability than those issued
by domestic courts or other arbitration forums.37 Although the position
note 27, at 18 tbl. 6.1.
30 Sinclair, supra note 24, at 415; Ole Spiermann, Individual Rights, State Interests and
the Power to Waive ICSID Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 ARB. INT'L
179, 183 (2004).
31 SALACUSE, supra note 21, at 1, 96.
32 Graham Mayeda, Playing Fair: The Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment in
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 273, 274 (2007).
33 See, e.g., Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of
Uruguay concerning the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments, art. 5, Oct. 7,
1988.
34 Bill Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary
Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307 (2008).
3 See Stiglitz, supra note 1. See also Marla Mansfield, Tahoe-Sierra Returns Penn
Central to the Center Track, 38 TULSA L. REv. 263 (2002) (describing doctrines of
regulatory takings in the context of U.S. jurisprudence).
36 Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement
in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REv. 1517, 1541 (2006).
3 Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors
Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1550, 1555
(2009). Contra Christophe Dugue, Dispute Resolution in International Project Finance
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staked out by Argentina as a result of its economic crisis of 2002 is
changing these perce tions, states generally pay awards issued by ICSID
tribunals voluntarily.
The origin and number of BITs in existence is well-documented,
although the reasons for their proliferation remain in dispute.3 9  After the
first BIT-generally agreed to be the treaty concluded between Germany
and Pakistan in 1959-the number of BITs increased steadily. 40 At the end
of the 1980s, records at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) showed 385 BITs; a decade later, the number reached 1,857;41
current estimates show approximately 3,000 BITs in force.42
The most parroted theory about BITs is that developing countries sign
them as a way to "credibly commit" to investors so as to encourage foreign
direct investment.4 3 Under one elaboration of this theory, scholars explain
the rise of BITs as a response to the decolonization and nationalization
movements of the 1950s and 1960s:
The nationalization of British oil assets by Iran in 1951, the
expropriation of Liamco's concessions in Libya in 1955, and the
nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt a year later served notice
of a new militancy on the part of investment hosts. The
nationalization of sugar interests by Cuba in the 1960s further
undercut assumptions about the security of international
Transactions, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1064, 1072 (2001) (noting that international financiers
often prefer English or New York courts).
38 M6lida N. Hodgson, Panel Presentation at Young Arbitrator's Forum (July 20, 2010).
3 See Kojo Yelpaala, Fundamentalism in Public Health and Safety in Bilateral
Investment Treaties [Part 1], 3 AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 235, 236, 239
(2008).
40 Id. at 236.
41 U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev. (UNCTAD), Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999,
at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000).
42 See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 23
(2009); Robert E. Greig, Claudia Annacker & Roland Ziade, How Bilateral Investment
Treaties Can Protect Foreign Investors in the Arab World or Arab Investors Abroad, 25 J.
INT'L ARB. 257, 259 (2008).
43 See, e.g., Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 826 ("Obsolescing bargaining
suggests that investors are more likely to demand treaties to protect their extractive and
primary production investments, at least relative to easier-to-relocate light manufactures.");
Brower & Schill, supra note 6; see Stephan W. Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function,
Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J.
INT'L L. 1 (2009); Wielde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 224 (noting that although politically
controversial, governments enter into agreements with investors to offset investor concerns
by guaranteeing a favorable tax regime addressing items such as accelerated depreciation
and amortization or providing a long loss carry-forward period; facilitation of foreign
exchange repatriation and offshore account facilities; and preferential treatment on import
duty and expatriate income tax exonerations).
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investments."
Simultaneously, developing countries used the U.N. General Assembly
to pass resolutions that purportedly upended customary international norms
for determining compensation in the event of nationalization. Those norms
had been advanced by capital exporting states to argue that customary
international law required the payment of "prompt, adequate, and effective"
compensation for the taking of property whether through direct or indirect
45
expropriation.
Certain scholars of international law and international political
economy have challenged important aspects of this theory. Jose Alvarez,
for example, argues the collective activity of developing countries at the
U.N. had a relatively small effect on what were understood to be the
customary international norms at the time,46 so there was no need to
"reassure" investors through BITs.47 He offers several alternative
explanations: after the decline of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s,
developing countries signed BITs (1) in order to signal-both internally and
externally-their acceptance that command economy norms were dead or
dying; (2) to signal that they would work toward fulfilling the expectations
of international lenders; (3) as part of a broader effort to build market-based
domestic institutions; and (4) to satisfy the pressures exerted by certain
domestic constituencies.4 Joseph Stiglitz views the proliferation of BITs as
a response to NGOs' extraordinarily strong resistance to the OECD's
proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment which would have created
4 Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 813.
45 The Hull Rule required prompt, adequate, and effective compensation upon
expropriation. See Alvarez, supra note 42, at 19.
46 Indeed, even after pressure from developing countries, the Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources required "appropriate" compensation. G.A. Res. 1803
(XVII), 4, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No.17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962). See
also Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Art. 2(2)(c), G.A. Res. 29/3281
(XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974) (emphasizing each State has a right
"[t]o nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property" provided
compensation is paid to the State pursuant to the State's laws, and disputes regarding
compensation will be resolved under domestic law unless another agreement has been
reached) available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/738/83/
IMG/NRO73883.pdfOpenElement; Yelpaala, supra note 39, at 246 (reviewing that the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties when read in its entirety "constituted a significant
departure from what was considered by capital exporting countries to be the customary
international law standard expressed in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Resolution 1803 adopted in 1963," giving States free
reign to adopt policies over their resources).
47 Alvarez, supra note 42, at 49-50. He notes that 27% of BITs are executed between
developing countries but (1) it is not clear how many of those are generated by BRICS and
(2) 90% of arbitration disputes are between Western investors and developing world
governments. See Van Harten, supra note 1, at 26.
48 Alvarez, supra note 42, at 41-42 (citations omitted).
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a multilateral instrument-like the laws under which the WTO operates-
giving the protections now obtained through BITs. 49 Almost all scholars,
however, at least impliedly accept that the driving force behind BITs is
developing countries competition for investments from companies based in
developed countries.
The economic effect of these treaties is also disputed.50 Some studies
conclude developing countries that sign BITs experience increases in
foreign direct investment and growth while others see no impact or even a
negative effect, considering the regulatory restraints placed upon the host
state. 5  Moreover, as awards from ICSID increase in size, the overall effect
on host state development and global investment flows is largely
unknown. 52
E. Insurance Regimes
Foreign investors may also protect their investments through an
increasing number of national, private or international insurance regimes, as
long as they meet certain conditions. 53 U.S. investors, for example, can
obtain insurance through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), as long as the investment is predominately owned by Americans, is
made in certain countries, and is intended to promote the economic
49 Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 482. The WTO itself is viewed as a multilateral agreement
that succeeded where a patchwork of bilateral or regional treaties could not. After its
formation, countries have still used bilateral treaties to obtain benefits they could not get
through the WTO. See Judith Goldstein & Richard Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: the Rise of
Judicial Liberalization at the WTO, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 211 (Ngaire
Woods & Walter Mattli, eds. 2009).
50 See Susan Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the
Rule of Law, 19 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 348-49 (2007) (citing
Salacuse and Sullivan's findings that when developing countries sign BITs with OECD
countries, FDI increases and that increase is likely to be larger if the country is the U.S.); See
Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct
Investment in Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEv. 1567 (2005).
51 Franck, supra note 50, at 349 ("Analysts from the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank, and elsewhere have conducted research
suggesting that investment treaties have a minimal impact on foreign investment."); Mayeda,
supra note 32, at 274 (noting that there have been large awards in cases involving BITs
placing a substantial burden on countries such as Argentina and the Slovak Republic, but
more problematically "[t]he legal and macroeconomic consequences of broad investment
rights are largely unknown") (change in original); Mary Hallward-Drimeier, Do Bilateral
Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit and They Could Bite
(June 2003), http://econ.worldbnank.org/files/29143_wps3121.pdf; Vahe Lskavyan &
Mariana Spatareanu, Host Country's Governance and the Size of Foreign Investors, 100
EcoN. LETTERS 258 (2008).
52 Bernard Hoekman & Richard Newfarmer, Preferential Trade Agreements, Investment
Disciplines and Investment Flows, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 949, 966 (2005).
53 Broches, supra note 24, at 76; WOLFGANG PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 343, 360 (2nd ed. 1995).
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development of the host country, among other requirements.5 4 OPIC also
requires investors to invest in host countries that have subrogation treaties
with the United States, allowing OPIC to attempt to reclaim its expenditure
from the host country, usually through a fiduciary agent located in the host
country (thereby avoiding direct political controversy).55 Other common
conditions imposed by home countries offering insurance to their investors
include the requirement that the investment be in a host country with which
the home country already has a BIT,56 or that the investment be new or an
- 57
expansion of an existing investment.
Private investment insurance programs have advantages and
disadvantages compared to national programs. While they cover nationals
of any country and can operate independently of policy objectives,s they
also must run a profit and are limited in the types of coverage they can
provide (such as long-term investment guarantees). 59 The private insurance
market is growing and now accounts for approximately half the market
previously dominated by national insurance schemes and the World Bank's
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).60
Since its creation, MIGA has been joined by 175 countries and has
issued over $21 billion of guarantees for over 600 projects.6 2 MIGA will
insure any investment made by a national or company of a member state
within another member state. MIGA insurance covers the risks associated
with currency transfer, expropriation, breach of contract, and war and civil
disturbance. Disputes are submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague.64 To date, MIGA has only paid out three claims: two claims
in response to host government intervention to control economic crises65
54 Id at 343.
5s Id. at 344.
56 RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 12-13
(1995); see Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International
Investment, Political Risk Insurance and Bilateral Investment Treaties: A View from Below,
27 CoLuM. FDI PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/
political-risk-insurance-and-bilateral-investment-treaties-view-below (examining the overlap
between political risk insurance and BITs in government provided agencies, the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency and through private companies).
5 PETER, supra note 53, at 345.
58 Id. at 359.
5 Id.
60 Of Coups and Coverage, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2007), http://www.economist.com/
node/8967224.
61 AGA Member Countries, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY,
http://www.miga.org/about/indexsv.cfm?stid=1695 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
62 Overview, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY, http://www.miga.org
about/index sv.cfm?stid=1736 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
63 PETER, supra note 53, at 363.
6 Id. at 364-65.
65 Frequently Asked Questions, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY,
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and one claim for a project damaged by a Maoist rebel attack in Nepal.66
However, MIGA has also resolved over fifty disputes over its guaranteed
67investments to prevent claims filings.
F. Joint Ventures
Investors may also reduce political risk by engaging in joint ventures.
Doing so can simultaneously limit an investor's exposure and increase the
number of parties that might eventually pressure a government that passes
an unfavorable law or regulation.6 8 In a joint venture with a state-owned
enterprise, the state might theoretically be deterred from passing laws or
regulations that would diminish the value of the state enterprise. The
stability of such arrangements, however, depends on the business
relationship between state and investor.69 Failure to agree on the terms of
an investment during a renegotiation, for example, might lead to
expropriation of the private portion of the joint venture. However,
assuming profits are high for the host state or the host state derives a benefit
from the private investor's expertise, foreign investors may use joint
ventures as part of an effective political risk management strategy.7 1
G. The Relative Importance of BITs in Securing Investments
Despite the alternatives available and used for investment protection,
scholars, practitioners, and international arbitrators focus on BITs as the
key security against host states' cheating on the original investment bargain.
Recently, however, Jason Webb Yackee has argued that the original
theoretical premise-that without BITs, cheating would be inevitable-is
specious. First, he notes, any host government seeking subsequent
investment would not cheat on an original investment out of reputational
concern.72 Second, it remains empirically unanswered whether BITs
encourage or deter investors from negotiating specific political or legal
risks. Signing BITs may deter such negotiation because "[miodern
investment treaties ... include methods of property and contract protection
which individual investors, in an often more difficult negotiating context,
http://www.miga.org/quickref/indexsv.cfm?stid=1587&pv-s#con9 (last visited Mar. 1,
2011). These interventions occurred in Argentina and Indonesia.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 INGRID DETTER DE LupIs, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 156 (2nd ed. 1987).
69 Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1435, 1473 (2000).
7o Id.; DETTER DE LupIs, supra note 68, at 172-73.
71 Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 69.
72 Jason Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract in
International Investment Law, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 121, 125 (2008)
[hereinafter International Investment Law].
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might not have been able to negotiate on their own."73 Yackee suggests a
BIT regime may be appropriate for small or medium-sized enterprise but, as
applied to large investors, undermines the legitimacy of the international
arbitration system and inefficiently distributes investment risk.
This Article provides theoretical and empirical support that investors
and host states are, and have been, capable of negotiating institutional
arrangements of varying complexity based on the asset specificity of the
investment.7 4 Using the framework developed by Ronald Coase and Oliver
Williamson, the thesis presented here is that investments which require a
shorter time commitment and fewer resources-like manufacturing, for
example, because the presence of many competitors drives down costs-
will demonstrate simpler contracts with easy exit as a primary remedy for
investors. Investments that require a significant commitment of time and
resources-like those in the extractive sector-will demonstrate more
complex arrangements addressing specific risks. These contracts will be
more likely to include contractual provisions governing a host states' ability
to change the law in a way that raises the investors' costs, accompanied by
specific arrangements for monitoring the extracted resource and resolving
any disputes.
III. COASE, WILLIAMSON AND INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING
A. Coase and The Nature of the Firm
In 1937, Ronald Coase suggested that firms presented a special
problem for the field of economics as it was then understood. s If it were
true, as Adam Smith had theorized, that the economic system worked itself
autonomously with supply effortlessly drifting to meet demand, there would
be no reason for firms to exist.76  All economic activity would occur
through arms-length contracts. Firms existed, Coase theorized, because
73 Id. at 131.
74 See infra notes 90-134.
7 See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, EcoNOMICs, ORGANIZATION &
MANAGEMENT (1992); Michael D. Whinston, Assessing the Property Rights and
Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope, 91 AM. EcoN. REV. 184, 184 (2001); Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
Am. EcoN. REV. 777, 783 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
312 (1976).
76 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386, 386-405 (1937); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 1119,
1121 (1990); See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs:
Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 61, 80
(2005).
77 Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM:
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT 160 (Oliver Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds.
1991) [hereinafter NATURE OF THE FIRM].
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arms-length contracts themselves involved some cost.78
Rather than continually negotiating with parties on the market, an
owner would bring the transaction under his or her control and reduce the
costs of making contracts.7 9 Whether or not an owner would use the
market, conclude longer-term contracts, or bring an activity under his or her
control became known generally as the "make-or-buy" question.
In The Nature of the Firm, Coase implicitly established a spectrum of
institutional arrangements between markets-the price mechanism-and
hierarchy-the firm-where command and control displaces the spot
market. Scholars following Coase sought to articulate the conditions
under which parties used firms instead of markets and to explore the
institutional arrangements that might economize on transaction costs as
initially explored by Coase. In between markets and firms, they identified
numerous contractual mechanisms that promoted efficient long-term
arrangements.
B. Oliver Williamson: Bounded Rationality, Opportunism and Asset
Specificity
Scholars 82 did not elaborate extensively on Coase's 1937 essay until
78 RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 (1988). Coase did not
actually coin the term "transaction costs" which is generally attributed to Kenneth Arrow,
The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus
Nonmarket Allocation, in THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: THE
PPB SYSTEM 59-73 (1969).
7 See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 114 (1971).
8 See Scott Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J. L., EcON., AND ORG. 181 (1988).
8 For example, Oliver Hart and John Moore argued that the firm's ownership of assets
(e.g., access to a certain machine or access to client lists) allowed it to establish incentives
for workers to act in the firm's interest vis-&-vis the opportunity to specialize skills. Because
workers need access to these assets to improve the value of their skills to the firm and thus
their bargaining position relative to the owner, the owner can indirectly encourage them to
act in his or her interest relative to an arms-length contract where the owner negotiated with
a second owner who directly employed the workers. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property
Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 1119, 1121 (1990). Raghuram Rajan
and Luigi Zingales modified this thesis to emphasize the access component of the Hart-
Moore theory. They argued that access, not ownership, is key to encouraging optimal
specific investment by workers. By carefully structuring access to key assets (broadly
defined), firms may not only encourage specific investment by workers through the bilateral
relationship with the owner, but may also create a "rat race" between workers to specialize.
Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387, 388
(1998).
82 See, e.g., OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNoMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 365-84
(1985) (tracing the shift in American antitrust enforcement against mergers) [hereinafter
EIC]; Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. EcON. REV. 777 (1972); Victor Goldberg, Regulation and
Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford
& Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
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after the publication of the arguably more influential The Problem of Social
Cost.8 3 Drawinq on the intellectual contributions of John R. Commons,
Herbert Spencer, 4and Karl Llewelyn," Oliver Williamson approached the
problem outlined by Coase by analyzing (1) the characteristics of
contracting parties and (2) the relative importance of the object of the
contract.8  With respect to contracting parties, Williamson assumed two
characteristics: (1) bounded rationality and (2) opportunism.87 With respect
to the object of the negotiation, Williamson argued institutional
arrangements move toward hierarchy as the good or service negotiated for
increases in mutual importance.88
1. Bounded Rationality
Bounded rationality is a function of the contract formation process.
Future events, contingencies, and needs suffer from what might otherwise
be termed a lack of imagination.89 It refers to the limitations and costs
humans face in acquiring and processing the full range of information
Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & EcoN. 297, 297-98 (1978); RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMATICS
OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 239 (1999); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1030-32
(1995).
83 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1, 1-44 (1960); Coase, The
Nature of the Firm: Influence, in NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note 77, at 63 ("Although the
attention given to my argument in 'The Nature of the Firm' in the 1970s and 1980s derived
in part from the interest in my views generated by the 'Social Cost' article and the greater
appreciation of the importance of transaction costs which it brought about, the writings of
Williamson must have had the same effect.").
84 See, e.g., G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140-41 (1958).
85 See, e.g., Karl Llewelyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Stop, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930).
16 OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1983) [hereinafter MARKETS]. For an exposition of a competing view of the
firm, see Kathleen R. Connor & C.K. Prahalad, A Resource-based Theory of the Firm:
Knowledge Versus Opportunism, 7 ORG. Sci. 477 (1996); Kathleen Connor, A Historical
Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools of Thought Within Industrial
Organization Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm?" 17 J. MGMT. 121, 121-
54 (1991).
87 Roy Radner argues that "bounded rationality" is comprised of two "costs"-those
associated with observation, communication and computation and "indeterminacy" like "not
knowing the implications of everything that one knows. Radner concludes that "economists
will not make further progress on the theory of the organization of the firm until we can deal
more effectively with both of these phenomena." Roy Radner, Bounded Rationality,
Indeterminacy and the Theory of the Firm, 106 ECON. J. 1360, 1360-61 (1996).
88 See generally WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 86.
89 Oliver E. Williamson, Internal Economic Organization, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATION 9, 15 (Oliver E. Williamson, Sven-Erik Sj6strand & Jan
Johanson eds., 1989) (citing HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 199 (1957)); see also MARK
CASSON, THE FIRM AND THE MARKET 41 (1987) (criticizing Williamson's "tortuous
terminology").
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required for optimal decision-making. Contracting parties face an inability
to negotiate future plans because parties "have to find a common language
to describe states of the world and actions with respect to which prior
experience may not provide much of a guide." 90 This condition of human
frailty means contracts will always be "incomplete," and will require, when
entering an exchange relationship, a contracting party to assume the other
party's behavior will be opportunistic in the future.91 Some scholars have
extensively elaborated on humans' cognitive limitations, while others have
used the phrase to simply denote the impossibility of predicting the future. 9 2
2. Opportunism
Opportunism is the tendency of economic agents to disclose
information "in a selective and distorted manner ... [including] effects to
mislead, disguise, obfuscate, and confuse . .. The essence of
opportunism is an individual's aspiration to realize his or her own egoistic
90 See D. Gordon Smith & Brayden King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIz. L. REV.
1, 17 (2009) (citing OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23
(1995)) ("The degree to which contracts are incomplete is not completely foreordained, but
depends in part on the tradeoff between the anticipated hazards of ex post opportunism and
the costs of ex ante design."); see also Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The
Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine
Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECON. 126, 127 (1993) ("Were contracting costless, it would be
possible in principle to design arrangements complete enough to circumscribe all surplus-
eroding redistributive tactics and intricate enough to mitigate investment distortions. In
practice, however, the costs of identifying contingencies and devising responses increase
rapidly in complex or uncertain environments, placing economic limits on the ability of
agents to draft and implement elaborate contractual agreements. When designing a contract,
the parties may mitigate ex post opportunism and investment distortions by the use of more
complete agreements, but at the cost of increased resources dedicated to crafting the
document a priori. As a consequence, environmental characteristics that generate increased
contracting costs should result in efficient contracts being less complete, whereas conditions
that exacerbate the potential for ex post inefficiencies should lead to more exhaustive
agreements.").
91 Oliver E. Williamson, The Law of Economic Organization, in NATURE OF THE FIRM,
supra note 77, at 92-93; but see PETER J. BOETTKE, THE ELGAR COMPANION To AUSTRIAN
ECONOMICS 175 (1998) ("[T]he transaction cost literature shows its neoclassical legacy in
posing the problem of the firm in terms of a maximization problem perceived ex visu of a
point in time. In present-day transaction cost economics, one explains particular business
institutions we observe in the world as having arisen to minimize the sum of production
costs and transaction costs. Those costs are normally understood implicitly to have arisen
from the environment in existence at the moment under analysis. Seldom does the theory
give thought to the possibility that organizational forms may be influenced as much by
environments that exist only as future possibilities, imagined or feared.").
92 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998); DAVID J. TEECE, VERTICAL
INTEGRATION & VERTICAL DIVESTITURE IN THE U.S. OIL INDUSTRY 31 (1976).
9 Williamson, Internal Economic Organization, supra note 89, at 15.
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interests, accompanied by cunning and deceit.94 Opportunism is closely
related with asset specificity or "hold up" in the theory-of-the-firm
literature.95 Because humans are limited in their cognitive capacities, and
because others will provide distorted information, parties demand
institutions to protect themselves.96 Opportunism can be both ex ante
(parties must assume information provided to them is distorted or imprecise
to the advantage of the other party) and ex post (upon an unforeseen change
in circumstances, a party will attempt to manipulate that change in its
favor). 97
3. Asset Specificity
Asset specificity refers to the idea that an investment made for
purposes of a particular transaction has more value for that transaction than
any alternative purpose.98 Because bounded rationality and opportunistic
behavior may cause the expropriation of gains, parties demand institutional
arrangements of varying strength to govern their contracts.99  These
institutions gain strength as the level of uncertainty and the value of the
asset within the relationship increase.100 Where parties meet on the open
market and conclude simple arms-length exchanges, the traditional
economic forces of supply and demand operate without significant cost.101
94 Evgeny V. Popov & Victoria L. Simonova, Forms of Opportunism Between Principals
and Agents, 12 INT'L ADVANCES IN ECON. RESEARCH 115, 115 (2006).
9 See D. Gordon Smith, The Branding Effects of Contracts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
189, n.20 (2007) (citing Conrad S. Ciccotello et al., Research and Development Alliances:
Evidence from a Federal Contracts Repository, 47 J.L. & EcoN. 123, 127 (2004) (citing
Scott E. Masten et al., The Costs of Organization, 7 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 1, 9 (1991)))
("Masten et al. suggest the possibility of holdup in the absence of asset specificity. They
use the term 'temporal specificity' to describe a situation in which 'timely performance is
critical, [and] delay becomes a potentially effective strategy for exacting price
concessions.").
96 HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 40; Gregory Jackson, Comparative
Corporate Governance: Sociological Perspectives, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
COMPANY 265,268-69 (John Parkinson, Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly eds., 2000).
9 Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of
the Multinational Corporation, 24 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 625, 639 (1993).
98 Tony McGuinness, Markets and Managerial Hierarchies, in MARKETS, HIERARCHIES
& NETWORKS 66, 69 (G. Thompson, et al. eds., 1994).
99 WILLIAMSON, EIC, supra note 82, at 47. Williamson adopts concepts of ex ante and ex
post opportunism from insurance literature. Parties are unable to "distinguish between risks
and the unwillingness of poor risks candidly to disclose their true risk condition." Failure of
parties to take "appropriate risk-mitigating actions" gives rise to ex post execution problems.
Id. Contra ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU, EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 253 (1994)
(explaining the tendency for this analysis to produce the unsatisfactory conclusion that "any
institution that exists must be optimal otherwise wealth-maximizing agents would have
exploited any 'attainable' improvements").
100 Williamson, Internal Economic Organization, supra note 89, at 16.
101 Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, MICROECONOMICs 2 (2004).
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When parties contract for assets uniquely valuable to the parties' use and
not readily available for alternative use or users, greater opportunities for
exploitation emerge. 10 2 Examples of transactions involving highly specific
assets include:
location of an electricity generating plant next door to a coal mine
that is going to supply it, a firm's expansion of capacity to satisfy the
demands of a particular customer, the training a worker undertakes to
operate a particular set of machines or to work with a particular
group of individuals, or a worker's relocation to a town where he has
a new job.'o3
These factors influence transactions differently, giving rise to manifold
arrangements (contracting regimes) that economize on incentives to
exploit.'1' Contract-cost economizing regimes vary depending on the
perceived need of the exchanged good or service provided and the limiting
effects of bounded rationality and opportunism.10  Within the literature on
BITs,106 asset specificity passes under the name of the "obsolescing
bargain" or the problem of "holdup":
102 But see Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) for empirical studies that show that both formal and
informal contracts play mediating and expectation-converging roles.
103 Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, in ORGANIZATION
THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 154, 158 (Oliver E.
Williamson ed., 1995). Contra D. Bruce Johnsen, The Quasi-Rent Structure of Private
Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44 EMORY L.J. 1277, 1316 (1995) ("Although this
example adequately served the authors' purpose in explaining the choice between vertical
integration and long-term contracting, the distinction between the specialized quasi-rent and
the appropriable specialized quasi-rent is somewhat misleading. In theory, there are many
possible dimensions of asset specificity and therefore many alternative measures of an
asset's specialized quasi-rent. At the time the investment is made, an asset can be specific to
a given user, to a given function, to a given location, et cetera. Which measure is
appropriate depends on which alternative states of the world are being examined.").
104 See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayers, Economic Rationales for
Mediation, 80 VA. L. REv. 323 (1994); Scott R. Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect
Markets: Should We Use Mediators in Deals?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 283 (2004).
But see Mark Klock, Financial Options, Real Options, and Legal Options: Opting to Exploit
Ourselves and What We Can Do About It, 55 ALA. L. REv. 63, 102 (2003) (arguing that ADR
may be more expensive than litigation in varying circumstances); Oliver Williamson,
Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526
(1983). Cf Masten, supra note 80, at 207 (arguing that common law doctrines recognize
multiple "modes" of transactions, which "may also warrant the establishment of alternative
sets of norms and conventions (namely, institutions) to govern disparate clusters of
transactions").
10 Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis ofDiscrete
Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SI. Q. 269, 271 (1991) [hereinafter Comparative
Economic Organization],
106 Brower & Schill, supra note 6, at 478.
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Holdup occurs when one contracting party [with an asset specific
investment] threatens another with economic harm unless
concessions are granted by the threatened party. The potential for
holdup exists only within contractual relationships, not in initial
contract negotiations, and it results from the investment of
relationship-specific assets by one of the parties. Anticipation of
holdup is said to motivate the structure of contractual
relationships. 107
The 1926 merger between GM and Fisher Body classically illustrates
the process by which parties move from contract to hierarchy as asset
specificity increases.108 In 1919, GM and Fisher Body concluded a ten-year
agreement in which GM agreed to an exclusive dealing clause as an
incentive for Fisher Body to invest in highly specialized manufacturing
equipment (stamping machines and dies). 09 To prevent opportunistic
behavior by Fisher Body (by charging monopoly prices for the bodies), the
contract stipulated prices could not exceed those of similarly manufactured
bodies by companies other than Fisher Body; disputes were to be settled by
compulsory arbitration." 0 Soon after 1919, demand for GM automobiles
increased significantly, producing general dissatisfaction on GM's part with
the price it was paying for Fisher bodies;GM pressed Fisher Body to move
its manufacturing plants nearer to GM plants, reducing transportation and
inventory costs.' Fisher Body refused and in 1924, GM began purchasing
Fisher Body stock and concluded a merger agreement in 1926." The GM-
Fisher Body relationship moved from market exchange to vertical
integration where asset specificity was very high." 3  The ten-year
agreement provided many of the features-e.g., arbitration and price
ceilings-that scholars like Coase and Williamson suggested be part of
hybrid institutions to promote efficient exchange.114 The GM-Fisher Body
example is one of several narratives used to show the empirical support the
theory enjoys. "'
107 Smith & King, supra note 90, at 17-18.
1os Klein, Crawford & Alchain, supra note 82, at 308; see also WILLIAMSON, EIC, supra
note 82, at 114.
109 Klein, Crawford & Alchain, supra note 82, at 308-09.
no Id. at 309.
.. WILLIAMSON, EIC, supra note 82, at 115.
112 Klein, Crawford & Alchain, supra note 82, at 310.
113 But see Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 119, 125-35 (1988) (arguing that the GM-Fisher Body example proves more
about transfer of property rights than other components of Williamson's theory like
resolving disputes by fiat and correcting asymmetries of information.).
114 See Barak Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory ofPrivate Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328,2329 (2004).
"5 See The Bigger Picture, ECONOMIST (Oct. 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com/
node/14632614 (reporting on Williamson's receiving the Nobel Prize for Economic
283
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 31:261 (2011)
C. The Coase-Williamson Framework and Foreign Investment
Williamson predicts asset specificity, transaction frequency, and
uncertainty are the primary factors which guide an activity toward vertical
integration, or the choice to bring a transaction within the firm. Between
arms-length transactions and command-and-control hierarchy are hybrid
institutions that deepen the contracting parties' relationship and
commitment: hostages, arbitration, take-or-pay procurement clauses, tied
sales, reciprocity, regulation, and threat of reputational loss, among
others.116  In the investment context, an investor may include within the
contract a demand that a host state provide some service before releasing a
royalty payment (a form of hostage exchange);' 17 an investor and a host
state may appoint a neutral monitor to ensure the investor's accounting
practices are fair; or, the host state may grant an investor freedom from
changes in the law, with an exception for changes in environmental laws or
regulations instituted in order to keep pace with technological changes and
duties to minimize environmental damage. 118
Sciences). But see ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU, EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 253 (Oxford
University Press 1994). While the critique of the traditional notion of efficiency has been
well taken, the ramifications of incorporating organizational costs in the notion of optimality
remain far from clear. A particularly discouraging feature of such models, when combined
with the behavioral assumption made, seems to be that they lead to the "'unpalatable
conclusion' . . . that any institution that exists must be optimal, otherwise 'wealth-
maximizing agents would have exploited any 'attainable' improvements."' Malcolm
Rutherford, Andreas Papandreou's Externality and Institutions, 33 J. EcoN. LITERATURE
1981, 1983 (1995) (book review) (quoting PAPANDREOU, supra).
116 Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization, supra note 105, at 269; DOUGLASS
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 55 (1990); see
also Carol Rose, Trust in the Mirror ofBetrayal, 75 B.U. L. REv. 531, 537 (1995); Michael J.
Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 734 (2004).
117 See Joy Mining Machinery, Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 15 (Aug. 6, 2004). In Joy Mining, a company
incorporated under the laws of England and Wales agreed to supply mining systems and
supporting equipment to an agency of the Egyptian government. Joy Mining provided letters
of guarantee for contractual obligations at the Bank of Alexandria. The contract provided
for the schedule and conditions for release of these guarantees linked to the performance of
the equipment and production levels. Although the ICSID panel determined that those
guarantees did not constitute an "investment" for purposes of jurisdiction (under more recent
decisions, it is questionable whether a current ICSID panel would refuse jurisdiction), the
episode is one of many that shows how foreign investors and host states exchange
"hostages" to promote exchange (in this case, the hostages were the letters of guarantee held
at a bank in the host state). MARKUS W. GEHRING & MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD TRADE LAW 405 (2005).
"1 Rajeev J. Sawant, The Economics of Large-Scale Infrastructure FDI: The Case of
Project Finance, 41 J INT'L BUS. STUD. 1036, 1036-56 (2009); see Judgment the
Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) 1997 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 25) ("In the field
of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often
irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limitation inherent in the very
mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.") (quoted in PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 247 n.65 (2003)); Anoop Madhok, Reassessing the
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Investment decisions are driven by many factors. Under liberal
economic theory, the fundamental drive is to deploy capital where it will
generate the highest returns. 19 Foreign direct investment may result in
higher returns where, for example, a manufacturer can economize on
transportation costs and there is a local demand for its products.120 The
decision to invest may also reflect a fear of losing ground to competitors.121
Finally, an enterprise might alternatively gain access to a foreign market by
licensing local producers, but the importance of controlling the quality of a
valuable trademark, for example, may encourage direct ownership.12 2
Many of these factors shape the agenda investors use during negotiations
with host states.
1. Foreign Investment, Bounded Rationality and Opportunism
Both host states and investors are subject to the limitations (bounded
rationality and opportunism) all contracting parties face. Complex
contracts governing long-term relationships, like investment contracts, are
necessarily incomplete. "They contain gaps and do not cover every
possible aspect of the parties' relation, because the future state of the world
is not fully predictable .. 123 Investors and states may, for example,
poorly predict what the price of an extracted resource might be in the near
term.
In addition to the risks of bounded rationality, both parties may impose
opportunistic risks as well. Foreign investors, for example, may present
host state negotiators with marginal cases to institute a tax regime. They
may also manipulate accounting practices or structure internal transactions
to avoid taxes or other costs imposed by the host government.125  In
Fundamentals and Beyond: Ronald Coase, the Transaction Cost and Resource-Based
Theories of the Firm and the Institutional Structure of Production, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
535, 535-50 (2002); Nicolai J. Foss, Bounded Rationality and Tacit Knowledge in the
Organizational Capabilities Approach: An Assessment and a Re-evaluation, 12 INDUS. &
CORP. CHANGE 185 (2003).
119 Kenneth Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 469, 473 (2000).
120 JOHN DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1993)
(arguing that corporations located in a foreign location must possess an ownership (0)
advantage (e.g. superior technology), a locational (L) advantage (e.g. available skills) and
have reasons to internalize (I) operations rather than outsource and license foreign firms).
121 Ravi Ramamurti & Jonathan Doh, Rethinking Foreign Infrastructure Investment in
Developing Countries, 39 J. WORLD Bus. 151, 162 (2004).
122 Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 119, at 475.
123 Schill, supra note 43.
124 Waelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 224 (noting the political tensions that can arise in the
non-renewable natural resources industry between investor companies and domestic
enterprises in relation to tax burdens).
125 Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 478 (citing petroleum contracts in Alaska and Alabama); see
Judith Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy
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infrastructure, investors may sell themselves goods and services from
affiliated companies at inflated prices knowing "[g]overnment policing of
conflict-of-interest issues of this sort [is] generally lax or absent in most
developing countries."l 26  Manufacturing plants importing components
from a parent investor company may manipulate transfer prices. Investors
may underestimate the environmental costs manufacturing or extractive
investments may impose. Host states may pass laws or issue regulations
after an investment agreement is in place which raises the cost of the
investment.127 Successor governments may renege on promises made by
previous governments.128  Host states or their affiliated state-owned
enterprises may provide faulty advice as to the cost of a project.129
2. Foreign Investment and Asset Specificity
In the domestic context, evidence for the Coase-Williamson theory is
often limited to case studies due to the difficulty of obtaining consistent
data on the cost of contracting, the complexity of a transaction, and,
especially, asset specificity.130  Similarly, applying the Coase-Williamson
theory to foreign investment contracting can be done only with at least three
important qualifications.13' First, economic exchange across international
boundaries is subject to distortion from national, regional and international
trade and tax regimes. Second, jurisdictional idiosyncrasies affect the study
Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1065, 1085 (2008)
(detailing Peabody Coal's efforts to reduce the royalty rate on a coal deposit in Navajo
territory through manipulation of the royalty rate-setting process). See also Duke Energy
Int'l Peru Inv. Ltd. 1 v. Republic of Peru, Award on the Merits, 18 August 2008, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/28; see also Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of
Renewed Nationalization, Rising Commodities and "Americanization" in International
Arbitration and the Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 359, 372 (2008) (detailing how newer investment agreements address some of these
opportunism risks). In their current dispute, the Government of Venezuela accuses Exxon
Mobil of characterizing some oil as "bitumen" in order to reduce amounts due under their
contract.
126 Ramamurti & Doh, supra note 121, at 162.
127 See Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing
Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC
Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4-5 (1994) (discussing political
risk and ways an investors could try to mitigate the risk through political risk insurance).
128 See Ramamurti & Doh, supra note 121, at 157-58.
129 See Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State Under International Law for Breach of
Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 142, 149 (2010).
130 See Howard Shelanski & Peter Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost
Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 335 (1995).
131 See, e.g., John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships and
Informal Credit in Vietnam, 114 Q. J. ECON. 1285 (1999); Simon Johnson, John McMillan,
& Christopher Woodruff, Contract Enforcement in Transition (Eur. Bank for Reconstruction
and Dev., Working Paper No. 45, 1999).
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of individual and aggregate economic phenomena. 13 2 Third, foreign direct
investment can involve complicated evaluations of currency exchange risk,
local or regional market potential, and other industry-specific
considerations. Despite these distortions and analytical difficulties,
predictions based on the theory find support in the case studies used here.
The Coase-Williamson theory predicts increasingly complex hybrid
institutions as assets become more specific to the relationship. When an
investor has many options and competition is robust, simple exchange
contracts will prevail. Where an investment requires significant capital
outlays, ten or more years of exploration, and physical specificity, the
theory predicts a more complex institution will govern the relationship:
Firms in industries characterized by large sunk costs, asset
specificity and immobility of assets, for example, necessarily make
more long-term commitments to host countries than firms in other
industries . . In contrast, small service or retail establishments
generally have lower sunk costs and higher mobility, making exit
strategies less problematic.133
i. Apparel and Footwear
As expected, in industries where retailers can choose from
manufacturers in many states, such as the sportswear and apparel industries,
simple-to-administer-contracts are common. 13 4 Consider the example of
Nike. Although known primarily as a footwear retailer, Nike is also a
significant retailer of sportswear apparel. The two product lines reflect the
fundamentals of Nike's contracting relationships. Footwear factories are
"usually large, capital-intensive facilities," whereas garment factories are
usually smaller and easy to establish.135 According to Richard Locke, et al.,
132 See Kusi Hornberger, How Do Companies Acquire Land When Looking Abroad for
Their Investments?, Private Sector Blog (Feb. 16, 2010), http://psdblog.worldbank.org/
psdblog/2010/02/how-do-companies-acquire-land-when-looking-abroad-for-their-
investments.html ("In the case of the own-versus-lease question, many jurisdictions do not
permit foreign ownership of land. For example, many countries in East Asia, such as
Indonesia and Thailand do not allow foreigners to own land. Thus, most foreign-owned
companies tend to lease from private citizens. On the other hand, in numerous parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa, in countries like Tanzania, Liberia and Zambia, all land is held by the
government on behalf of the people and thus the only option is for companies to lease from
the government in the form of a long term lease.").
133 Jennifer Oetzel, Kathleen A. Getz, & Stephen Ladek, The Role of Multinational
Enterprises in Responding to Violent Conflict: A Conceptual Model and Framework for
Research, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 331, 350 (2007).
134 Gerard P. Cachon, The Allocation of Investment Risk in a Supply Chain, 50 MGMT.
Sct. 222 (2004).
135 Richard Locke, Fei Qin, & Alberto Brause, Does Monitoring Improve Labor
Standards? Lessons from Nike (Corp. Soc. Resp. Initiative, Working Paper No. 24, 2006),
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edulm-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_24locke.
pdf.
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"[t]hese industry differences have a significant impact on the kinds of
relationships that Nike can develop with its various suppliers."13 6  In
footwear:
Nike has been able to develop long-term relationships with several
large Korean and Taiwanese firms. With some of these firms, Nike
designers create and then relay via satellite new footwear designs
and styles for upcoming seasons to suppliers, who in turn, develop
the prototypes. Once these prototypes are approved, these lead
suppliers fax the product specifications to their various plants
throughout Southeast Asia, where production can take place almost
immediately. This level of trust and coordination facilitates both
production and (presumably) compliance activities for Nike.'37
In apparel, on the other hand:
[G]iven short production cycles and volatile fashion trends, the
situation is completely different. Nike works with numerous
suppliers, most of whom are also producing apparel in the same
factories for other (often competitor) companies. Given that
different apparel suppliers specialize in particular market segments,
shifts in consumer preferences or fashion trends could translate into
very short-term contracts with and/or limited orders from Nike. This
alters both the level of influence which Nike has with these suppliers
as well as its ability to monitor on a regular basis the production
processes and working conditions of these factories.' 38
The complexities of Nike's contracts vary accordingly. While a
handful of Korean and Taiwanese firms enjoy sharing intellectual property
and securer footwear orders (including an exclusive production relationship
and guaranteed monthly minimum orders),139 generally a regime of short
term contracts prevails in apparel. 140
ii. Owning or Leasing Land
For foreign investments requiring land, the decision to purchase
freehold rights or obtain long-term leases similarly varies with the asset
136 Id. at 10.
13 Id. at 10-11.
138 Id. at 11.
13 Suk-Jun Lim & Joe Phillips, Embedding CSR Values: the Global Footwear Industry's
Evolving Governance Structure, 81 J. Bus. ETHICS 143, 148-49 (2007).
140 Dong-Sung Cho & Wujin Chu, Determinants of Bargaining Power in OEM
Negotiations, 23 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT. 343-55 (1994) (detailing how Nike attempted to
force a major Korean footwear manufacturer to abandon its relationship with Reebok,
terminated its original equipment manufacturer agreement to move to China and found itself
unable to achieve the same reliability with Chinese firms and returned to Korea, paying a
fifty percent increase in price to do so).
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specificity of the investment. Foreign investors entering garment, retail,
hospitality, agribusiness, and service sectors typically prefer to lease land so
they can quickly exit should the investment take a downward turn.141
Conversely, investors in capital-intensive and/or physical infrastructure
projects like machinery, electronics and pharmaceuticals will tend to
purchase land in freehold.142
Figure I Share of Majority Foreign-Owned Companies which lease land by sector.
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The likelihood of owning land is also correlated to the size of the
investment. For larger investments, land purchase is more likely than
obtaining long-term leases.
Figure 2 Share of Majority Foreign-Owned Firms which lease land by firm size:
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The lease or purchase of land to serve investment needs is often
accompanied by negotiations with the host government. For example,
investors must contract with host states in the manufacturing sector in order
to receive special treatment, such as free trade zones, or certain tax
141 See Homberger, supra note 132.
142 id.
143 id.
144 id
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incentives.145 As Yackee notes, "Intel's practice when deciding whether to
construct new semi-conductor manufacturing facilities, for example, is to
enter into intensive haggling with potential host states over a variety of
fine-grained matters, and to insist that any resulting deal be committed to a
written contract before the investment will be sunk."1 4 6
iii. Institutional Variation
Investors and host states have traditionally devised numerous
contractual arrangements to address problems of bounded rationality,
opportunism, and holdup. Dalia Marin and Monika Schnitzer have
documented the use of barter in international trade where host states are
reluctant to give access to foreign ownership in their markets. 147 In the
extractive industry, investors have mitigated political risk through early
termination rights, open-ended exploration and development commitments,
and balancing of clarity and vagueness with respect to obligations and
duties. 148 Indeed "hostage-taking" is a method commonly used by foreign
investors to reduce political risk-requiring the state to provide some
service and/or having the contractual right to withhold some payment until
that service is provided or a condition is met. 149
IV. STABILIZATION CLAUSES
Stabilization clauses are one mechanism by which investors and host
states have ensured the credibility of their commitments.o Not all
investment contracts include stabilization clauses, but they are common in
contracts for a wide range of industries in most regions of the world."'
Stabilization clauses are often coupled with renegotiation clauses in
investment agreements to provide for changes in circumstances affecting
the interests of the investor and the host state.152 Investors and states use
stabilization clauses to form part of the ground rules upon which the
investors operate the project; guide informal dealings and formal
negotiations between the parties to the agreement; and serve as a formal
145 See Yackee, Empirical Studies ofBilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 2.
146 Yackee, International Investment Law, supra note 72, at 133.
147 DALIA MARIN & MONIKA SCHNITZER, CONTRACTS IN TRADE AND TRANSITION: THE
RESURGENCE OF BARTER 11 (2002).
148 Wdelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 226-27.
149 PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 130-32 (1997).
1so Gaetan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic
Environmental Policies: Striking A "Reasonable" Balance between Stability and Change, 29
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 451, 453 (1998).
151 Shemberg, supra note 27 (citing G.R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts: Application
Law and Settlement of Disputes: Law and Practice, Booklet 8 301, 307-09 (July 1983)).
152 Id. at 2.
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protection of rights if a dispute should arise. 153  The clause may also
provide the investor a legal basis to resist compliance with new laws even if
host government authorities are unable or unwilling to monitor the
investor's compliance and no formal dispute arises. The international case
law largely supports the propositions that (1) stabilization clauses are lawful
and legally binding under international law and (2) parties treat stabilization
clauses as binding,5 4
In "likely the first empirical study on modern stabilization practice
covering a wide range of industries and regions of the world," Andrea
Shemberg, in cooperation with the IFC and the UN Special Representative,
obtained seventy-six current investment contracts and twelve model
contracts from various sources including international law firms (the
"Shemberg Study").155  The data gleaned from these contracts support
predictions generated by the Coase-Williamson theory: for highly asset
specific investments like mining and petroleum, parties are inclined to agree
that changes in the law will be inapplicable to the investment. For sectors
in which investments demonstrate lower asset specificity like
telecommunications or light manufacturing, stabilization clauses either do
not exist or they are weaker, allowing for compensation to an investor for
complying with new laws only after reaching a certain threshold or
exempting areas of new laws like human rights codes altogether.
There are both acknowledged and unacknowledged limitations noted
in the Shemberg Study. Evidence of the use and function of stabilization
clauses remains limited. 5 6  Agreements between investors and host
governments are generally confidential-details about them discovered
only through legal proceedings or confidential interviews. Given the
hundreds or thousands of investment agreements in existence, the sample
may provide a skewed glimpse into the broader world of contracting
between investors and states. Participating law firms extracted only
specific information requested for the study and did not make the entire
contracts available nor did they disclose the identity of the investment
project. The lawyers who provided redacted investment agreements and
"' Id. 1125.
154 Cotula, supra note 28, at 162 (citing Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 53 ILR 389 1 59 (1977)); Kuwait v. American Indep. Oil Co., Arbitration Award,
21 ILM 976 (1982); AGIP Co. v. Congo, Arbitration Award, 21 ILM 726 (1982); S.K.
Chatterjee, The Stabilization Clause Myth in Investment Agreements, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 97, 98
(1988); Verhoosel, supra note 150, at 456.
155 The study also conducted a literature review and a review of reported contract and
investor-state disputes that may be relevant to understanding the legal enforceability of such
clauses as well as interviews with negotiators, lenders and lawyers who negotiate investment
contracts or litigate disputes for states and investors, and with nongovernmental
organizations members who have conducted research on stabilization clauses. Shemberg,
supra note 27.
156 Id.
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were interviewed about stabilization clauses may, consciously or
unconsciously, shape their redactions and statements in a way favoring
existing or potential clients.15 7  Indeed, independent interviews with
practitioners indicated that international arbitration litigation practices at
large private international law firms are heavily involved in pre-investment
advising.' Participants in the Shemberg Study did concede that the links
between bilateral and regional investment treaties and stabilization clauses
are not well understood. Investments made through project finance from
regional or international lenders, secured through political risk insurance or
through a joint venture with a state-owned enterprise may face varying
pressures as to the type and strength of stabilization clauses.6 0 The
contracts used in the study were in English or had English translations
readily available. 161
Nevertheless, an empirical study of stabilization clauses of this breadth
and scope is unlikely without financial and logistical support from major
funders like the IFC; therefore, the Shemberg Study provides a unique
opportunity to study investor-state contracting behavior. What follows is an
elaboration of the findings of the study, including the kinds of stabilization
clauses used, the sectors in which they are prevalent, and how they
demonstrate or refute principles of efficient contracting according to the
theories developed by Coase and Williamson.
A. Freezing Clauses
"Freezing clauses" render new laws completely inapplicable to the
investment over the entire life of the project. These clauses often secure a
specific fiscal regime for an investment. For example,
The . .. Laws and Decrees which may in the future impose higher
tax rates or more progressive rates of [tax] or would otherwise
impose a greater ... tax liability than anticipated under Section ...
157 There is the additional factor that these law firms, at least with respect to international
arbitration, are highly Americanized. Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The
Convergence of Renewed Nationalization, Rising Commodities and "Americanization" in
International Arbitration and the Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses,
43 TEx. INT'L L.J. 359, 368 (2008).
158 After reviewing the data summarized in the Shemberg Study, I interviewed six
attorneys (two partners and four senior associates) at large private law firms in Washington,
D.C. to obtain at least anecdotal evidence as to 1) the extent that international arbitration
practitioners were involved in pre-investment advising and 2) the relationship between
stabilization clauses and BITs.
159 Shemberg, supra note 27, at 42-43.
160 There is some reason to believe that certain international lenders are more likely to
require stabilization clauses, especially freezing clauses. Wielde & Ndi, supra note 28, at
228-29 (emphasizing that a financial institution's "core concern is the ability of the project
to repay its debt.") .
161 Shemberg, supra note 27,T 4 7 , at 13.
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of the Upstream Project Agreement shall not apply to the
Company."' 62
"Limited freezing clauses" render only a narrow class of laws or
regulations inapplicable to an investment. For example, a partial freezing
clause might give a specific exemption to an investment for any new labor
laws.163
B. Economic Equilibrium Clauses
"Economic equilibrium clauses" protect against the financial effects of
changes in the law as opposed to freezing the law's applicability. An
investor must comply with a new law, but the host state must compensate
the investor for compliance or allow adjustments to the agreement
providing for a lower level of, or delayed compliance with, the new law.164
Economic equilibrium clauses may impose a materiality threshold below
which compensation is not permitted or may require the host state to restore
the investor to its original state "to the extent reasonably possible."165 A
"limited economic equilibrium clause" will provide for compensation for
complying with new laws, but will only do so after a certain threshold is
reached. A limited economic equilibrium clause may also provide an
exemption from the otherwise applicable standards for applying economic
equilibrium:
Notwithstanding the generality of the foregoing or anything to the
contrary, the Parties acknowledge that the provisions of [the
economic equilibrium clause] shall not apply if . .. the new law or
decree has been enacted by the Government [state] with the intent of
protecting health, safety, the environment or security, and is
generally applicable to all ventures having the same general purpose
as does the Project. 166
C. Hybrid Stabilization Clauses
"Hybrid clauses generally give the investor an opportunity to demand
adjustments to the contract, including exemption from the law, to
compensate the investor." 67  Hybrid clauses explicitly provide that
162 Id. 25.
163 Id. 63.
'6 Wlelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 218-19 ("[I]n the last ten to twenty years,
stabilization clauses have undergone a substantial revolution . . . Instead of targeting the
legislative power of the state founded on sovereignty, these commitments are designed to set
up a contractual mechanism of allocating the financial effect of political risk to the state
enterprise."); see also Mohamed Al Faruque, Typologies, Efficacy and Political Economy of
Stabilization Clauses: A Critical Appraisal, 4 TRANSNAT'L DISPUTE MGMT. 31-33 (2007).
165 Shemberg, supra note 27, 26-27, at 6-7.
166 Id. at 8.
167 Id at Summary of Analysis.
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exemptions from a law are one way of restoring an investor to the position
it held before the new law was passed.168 An example:
if any existing Laws of [the host country] or any other applicable or
existing law of any other Government, is changed or repealed, or if
new laws are introduced, or if there occurs a rise in the tax rate or the
introduction of a new tax, which bears unfavourably on the financial
status of the Joint Venture or the Parties, then the Parties will apply
all efforts that are necessary to completely or partially release the
Joint Venture or the Parties from the above-mentioned changes, or
the Parties will undertake all other necessary steps to alleviate the
unfavourable impact of these changes.' 6 9
D. Stabilization Clauses and Asset Specificity
Based on the theory elaborated by Coase and Williamson, highly asset-
specific investments such as petroleum extractions-where high fixed costs
"require large capital injections in the early stages of the project and where
long time frames are needed for the economic viability of the project"-are
more likely to enjoy a full freezing of the law, so as to reduce to the greatest
extent possible the uncertainty posed by local law. 170 For smaller
infrastructure projects such as road construction, involving less uncertainty
but where changes in local law can still affect the expected value of the
investment, either general or limited economic equilibrium clauses will
prevail. Factors important to determining the likelihood of opportunism by
a host government include its overall reputation for stability, the existence
of transparent and legitimate administrative processes, and an independent
judiciary.
The table below presents a simplified view of the study's findings:
Sector Full Partial Hybrid Full Economic Partial Economic None Total
zing F reezing _ Equilibrium Equilibrium
Extractives 5 4 5 2 2 0 18
Other Transport 0 1 0 3 2 1 7
Infrastructure 1 0 1 1 1 0 4
Power 0 1 0 15 15 1 32
Road 0 0 0 2 4 0 6
Rail 0 0 0 2 3 0 5
Water 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Telecom 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
Total Contracts 6 6 6 27 28 3 76
16 8 Id. 22.
169 Id. 31, at 8.
170 Cotula, supra note 28, at 160.
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1. Regional Differences
Stabilization clauses were featured with greater frequency and force in
investment contracts with developing countries.171  Countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, which are likely to have low or no ratings from risk rating
agencies, were far more likely to have full freezing clauses in their
contracts.17 2  Moreover, those stabilization clauses are notable for their
breadth. 173 Full freezing clauses are less likely to be found in agreements in
the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Europe and Central Asia,
East Asia, and Latin America. 174 The study found limited freezing clauses
in the Middle East and North Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean;
Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Central Asia; South Asia; and Sub-
Saharan Africa. 171 Stabilization clauses in investment agreements with
developed countries are likely to have only the narrowest limited economic
equilibrium clauses.176
Although generally regional differences correspond with country credit
risk ratings, the ratings for OECD countries and Sub-Saharan African
countries appear to be influenced by other factors. The study found that the
OECD countries with limited stabilization clauses in their investment
agreements also possess low risk ratings. For sub-Saharan Africa, Moody's
had only rated one country. As expected, the Shemberg Study found a high
percentage of freezing clauses as well as a high percentage of full economic
equilibrium clauses in investment agreements with sub-Saharan African
countries. The perception of political risk appears to drive these extreme
differences. 177
171 Shemberg, supra note 27, at 15 fig. 5.1. The contracts and models analyzed include
eleven from Sub-Saharan Africa; fourteen from East Asia and Pacific; sixteen from the
Middle East and North Africa; ten from Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Central Asia;
five from South Asia; nineteen from Latin America and the Caribbean; and thirteen from
OECD countries (other than Turkey, which is included in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe
and Central Asia). Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of contracts and models used in the
study.
172 Id. at pt. 6.1.
173 One investment agreement with a sub-Saharan state provided an initial duration of
fifty years with an option of extending for another fifty years at the discretion of the investor.
In addition, the investment is exempt from all host state taxes except the royalty payment
due under the agreement. Id.
174 Id. at 23, fig. 6.3.
17 Id. at pt. 6.1.
176 Shemberg, supra note 27, at 17-19, pt. 6.1.
"' Id. 118, at 33 ("It is less clear that the stabilization practice in non-OECD countries,
other than those of Sub-Saharan Africa, can be explained by country risk perception. Of the
remaining non-OECD regions, the ratings are quite mixed. According to Moody's historical
data, 7 countries in East Asia and Pacific obtained investment grade, 4 speculative grade,
and 3 were not rated. For the Middle East and North Africa, there were 8 countries with
investment grade, 4 with speculative grade, and 5 not rated. For Southern, Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, 3 countries obtained investment grade, 3 speculative grade, and 4 were not
rated. In Latin America, 1 country obtained investment grade, 15 speculative grade, and 3
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2. Freezing Clauses
Stabilization clauses were also more prominent in investment
agreements governing highly capital-intensive industries where large initial
outlays made investors "hostage" to host governments.178 Every investment
agreement in the extractive sector, for example, contained some form of
stabilization clause. In the telecommunications sector stabilization clauses
were present in only one of two agreements. The difference corresponds
with the greater political risk associated with a natural resource project than
with a private sector public service project.179
Five of the six full freezing clauses in the study governed investment
agreements in the mining sector, where asset specificity is very high. 180
Full and limited freezing clauses appeared in nine of eighteen of the
extractive contracts. In contrast, in sectors with significantly less physical
(or other) asset specificity, freezing clauses were far less frequent. Only
one of thirty-two power projects, one of seven transportation contracts, and
one of four infrastructure projects included freezing clauses. Freezing
clauses did not appear in the railroad, road, water, telecom, or health care
contracts or models.18
These sectors do not require the same level of commitment by an
investor or a host state; therefore, the contractual mechanism is more
flexible.
3. Economic Equilibrium Clauses
The most common form of stabilization clause identified in the study
is the full or partial economic equilibrium clause. Instead of targeting the
sovereign legislative power of the state, they govern the effects of
legislative changes on investments.182
were not rated. And in South Asia, 1 country obtained investment and 4 speculative
grade.").
178 Id.
' Wdelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 224 (explaining that more often political tension
arises in the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources industry because the tax burden
is raised on the standard fiscal regime, but only foreign companies are permitted or able to
gain favorable tax provisions, such as accelerated depreciation, under the BIT which in turn
is perceived as a discriminatory favor to benefit foreign investors at the expense of domestic
enterprises).
180 Shemberg, supra note 27, 55-58, at 15-16. Six of the investment agreements in
the Shemberg Study contain limited freezing clauses of which four had fiscal freezing
clauses. Two contracts from the Middle East and North Africa in oil and gas, one power
contract from South Asia, and one Sub-Saharan African mining contract. The two other
limited freezing clauses included at least some nonfiscal issues. One from Eastern, Southern
Europe and Central Asia for a gas pipeline project and one from Latin America and the
Caribbean in transportation.
181 Id. at 18 tbl. 6.1.
182 As Cotula notes, the 1997 AGIP/British Petroleum/Etal-Kazakhstan "Kashagan"
Production-Sharing Agreement requires parties to take action to restore the "overall
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As with freezing clauses, economic equilibrium clauses are more
likely in contracts involving non-OECD states than in contracts involving
OECD states. In Western Europe, only one rail project and one road project
included a full economic equilibrium clause; the remaining twenty-five
investment agreements and model contracts provide for limited economic
equilibrium.
In non-OECD states, economic equilibrium clauses of both kinds were
more common. In the electricity and water industries, public authorities
often can set prices and bar investors from passing regulatory cost increases
on to end-users. Economic equilibrium clauses provide a mechanism by
which investors can guard against the risk of these legislatively-imposed
higher costs. 184 In the Shemberg Study, approximately half of the water,
telecommunications, and power industry contracts contain full economic
equilibrium clauses. Similarly, of five transvortation contracts, three
contained full economic equilibrium clauses. 8 Of the seventy-six
contracts in the study, twenty-eight of them limit the scope of the coverage
of the clause, permitting adjustments to the contract or compensation only
under designated circumstances. 186
Infrastructure and power agreements demonstrated the most diverse set
of arrangements. This might be explained in part because those agreements
cover a wide range of asset-specific investments:
Infrastructure deals cover the range of possible government/private
sector relationships, including simple construction contracts; build,
operate, and transfer (BOT) projects; purchases of public firms; and
build, operate, and own investments operating under state regulatory
authority. Behind many of these deals are power purchase
agreements which are long-term agreements with the buyers of a
project's service-such as a commercial purchaser of electricity-
that provide funds for payment of project expenses, repayment of the
project's debts, and dividends or distributions to those who hold
equity in the project. 87
economic benefit" of the agreement should any change in Kazakhstani law have a material
adverse effect on the investor's economic benefits. Cotula, supra note 28, at 161 n.14.
183 Shemberg, supra note 27, 1 69, at 21.
184 Id. 20, at 5.
15 Id. 81, at 25.
186 Id. 83, at 25.
187 Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 69, at 1470 n.123 ("Under a BOT arrangement,
the contractor builds the plant and then sells the power that is produced for a period of time.
Once one is committed to a risky environment, more control over the environment may be
preferred to less. In some cases the firm may only consider the extremes of equipment sales
or a BOT project. An intermediate case where the firm accepts much of the risk and has little
control over its magnitude may be the worst possible strategy. Thus the structure of the deals
reflects guesses about the stability of the political regime and the legal system.").
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4. Hybrid Clauses
Hybrid clauses obligate the state party to attempt to provide
exemptions from new laws, or explicitly contemplate exemptions as a
means to compensate the investor for changes in the law. In the Shemberg
Study, hybrid clauses appeared in only six of the seventy-six agreements,
and appeared to govern oil and gas projects in the Eastern Europe, Southern
Europe, Middle East and Central Asian regions.188 One project provides an
explicit recognition of the host state's obligation to implement international
standards or to adapt to scientific and technological progress through
domestic legislation. It does not make stabilization applicable to those
laws. "
A second contract in the study was designed to specifically stabilize
foreseeable changes in labor law. The stabilization clause required the
government to compensate the investor for all changes to labor and
employment laws, even if consistent with EU standards, until the latter of
either 2016 or when the host state becomes a candidate for EU
membership. 190
E. Investors and States Use Diverse Institutional Governance Structures
The stabilization clauses reviewed in the Shemberg Study both support
the thesis that states and investors demonstrate efficient contracting
behavior, considering ex ante and ex post probabilities of opportunism and
showng significant diversity in institutional design. The following are short
descriptions of different ways parties limit or redistribute risk.
1. Sharing Benefits and Costs of Changes in the Law
In his 2008 article on the deficiencies in bilateral investment treaties
188 Shemberg, supra note 27, 1 85, at 26. Some appear to have been modeled after the
ECT.
Id 87, at 26 ("The above [stabilization] provisions do not apply in cases where the
purpose of the adoption of a new Law or the amendment of a Law after the Date of Signing
of the Concession Contract is to implement International Standards or technical,
environmental, security or policing standards in adapting to scientific or technical
progress.").
190 Id. at 27 n.42 ("'The State Authorities shall take all actions available to them to
restore the Economic Equilibrium established under the Project Agreements if and to the
extent the Economic Equilibrium is disrupted or negatively affected, directly or indirectly, as
a result of any change . . . in . . . Law (. . . excluding any . . . Law(s) . . . with respect to
cultural heritage, health, safety, the environment and . . . employment/labour relations . . . to
the extent such . . . Laws do not impose . . . conditions more onerous than those generally
observed by the member states of the European Union respecting cultural heritage, health,
safety, the environment and . . . employment/labour relations . . . . The reference to
'employment/labour relations' in this Section 7.2(x) shall only apply after the later of (i) 1
January 2016, and (ii) the date the State becomes an Official EU Candidate. . . .' Georgian
Caspian South Caucuses Pipeline project, available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?
categoryld=9006628&contentld=7013497.").
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and the need for an international commercial court, Joseph Stiglitz argued
that a principal deficiency in modern investment treaties is their asymmetry:
While companies demand compensation when a government-
initiated change lowers the value of their assets, they do not offer to
return to the government the increase in value from positive changes.
Indeed, attempts by a government to capture an increase in value
resulting from government actions might themselves be subject to
investor suits, unless such recapture is guaranteed in the treaty
itself.11
That may be true for investment treaties, but investor-state agreements
appear to demonstrate a higher degree of sensitivity to the allocation of
costs and benefits for changes in the law. Many stabilization clauses are
drafted with the intent of limiting the application of the stabilization clause
in some ways, ensuring fairness in its application, and preserving the long-
term mutual interests of the parties, including the distribution of gains (as
opposed to losses) from changes in the law to both parties.192
Approximately one-third of the limited economic equilibrium contracts
and models narrow the scope of coverage (exempting some laws) and
contain a "threshold loss requirement under which no compensation or
contract adjustment is due the investor for changes in law." A similar
percentage of economic equilibrium contracts and models require the
investor to mitigate the costs imposed by change in the law. These
provisions make sense for the sectors in which they are most common:
power and road projects.
2. Renegotiation
Nearly all of the economic equilibrium clauses in the contracts and
models in the Shemberg Study provide for an informal process or
contractual duty to negotiate adjustments or compensation before resorting
to formal dispute resolution procedures. 19 4  Approximately one-third of
those clauses identify an independent expert or regulatory body to verify the
costs claimed and to determine which party should bear them.195 Freezing
191 Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 457.
192 Shemberg, supra note 27, 95, at 28 ("For example, over 25 percent of the economic
equilibrium contracts in the study contain stabilization provisions that apply in both the
investor's and the host state's favor. For changes in law that create a windfall, lower costs, or
higher revenues, the host state shares in the benefit. None of the freezing or hybrid contracts
contains such a clause.").
193 Id. 96.
194 Id. 97; Cotula supra note 28, at 165 ("In the case of economic equilibrium clauses,
parties are under an obligation to negotiate in good faith so as to restore the economic
equilibrium following regulatory change; but they are not under an obligation to reach an
agreement.").
' Shemberg, supra note 27, 97, at 28.
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clauses do not provide for renegotiation or verification, but instead either
prohibit changes in law or require exemption for the investment. Four of
six of the hybrid clauses require the host state to remedy the impacts on the
economic equilibrium of the investment. The other two sample hybrid
clauses provide for renegotiation or amendments in good faith when
exemptions or compensation is not possible. Neither the freezing nor hybrid
clauses provide for an independent expert or third party to verify costs or to
allocate risk among the parties from the change in law.
These clauses provide a rough sketch of how parties are good at
minimizing transaction costs.' 97 For example, when Venezuela unilaterally
changed the legal structure under which extraction in the Orinoco Belt
operated, foreign investors, relying on the procedures included in the
stabilization clause, decided to renegotiate the terms of the concessions. 9
As a result of its abrupt reordering of its investment law (analysts generally
agree it was done to expropriate the value available from the spike in global
oil prices), Venezuela has subsequently encountered a reputational loss and
difficulty finding partners for more recent projects.19
196 Id.
197 Klaus Peter Berger, Renegotiation and Adaptation of International Investment
Contracts: The Role of Contract Drafters andArbitrators, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1347,
1359-60 (2003) (citing the Vietnam-Laslo oil concession clause, "'If after the Effective
Date, new law(s) and/or regulation(s) are introduced in Vietnam adversely affecting
CONTRACTOR'S interest, or any amendments to existing laws and/or regulations are made
then the Parties shall meet and consult each other and shall make the necessary changes to
this Agreement to ensure that CONTRACTOR is restored to the same economic conditions
which would have prevailed if the new law and/or regulation or amendment had not been
introduced.' In Article 11, the contract contains an arbitration agreement for 'all disputes
arising out of or in connection to the contract.' In Article 17.9 the parties are granted the
right to present all 'questions, which are in substance of a technical nature' to an
'independent expert of international reputation."').
198 Thomas J. Pate, Evaluating Stabilization Clauses in Venezuela's Strategic Association
Agreements for Heavy-Crude Extraction in the Orinoco Belt: The Return of a Forgotten
Contractual Risk Reduction Mechanism for the Petroleum Industry, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 347, 374 (2008-2009) ("The stabilization clause itself provided that in the event that
the 'Foreign Party' deemed that an event that would cause a material adverse impact had
occurred, it would notify PDVSA," the Venezuelan state-owned entity that "would cooperate
with the Foreign Party to pursue legal action and 'negotiate in good faith compensatory
damages and/or possible modifications to the Agreement designed to restore the economic
benefit that the Foreign Party would have received had the [event] not occurred."').
199 See Foreign Investment in Venezuela Decreases in the Third Quarter, EL UNIVERSAL
DAILY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2008), http://english.eluniversal.com/2008/11/18/en-ecoesp
foreign-investment-i 18A2134141.shtml; see also Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-
Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 288 (1995) (implying that regulatory interventions can help modify the
swings between nationalization and privatization).
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3. Specification ofApplicable Laws, Threshold Loss Limits, Foreseeability
and Discriminatory Effect
The limited economic equilibrium contracts from developing countries
generally limit stabilization coverage through three mechanisms: (1)
designated issue areas for inclusion or exclusion (e.g. tax and
environmental laws); (2) stabilization of laws but limits on coverage by
providing a threshold loss requirement (i.e. the investor must suffer a loss
of a given magnitude for the clause to apply); or (3) stabilization of "not
foreseeable" changes in law. 200
i. Included and Excluded Laws
Investors and states will negotiate areas of the law that balance state
obligations with investor expectations. Two Latin American and Caribbean
power projects provide a detailed list of what is included in the stabilization
clause: fiscal and customs issues, environmental, labor or work safety laws,
regulatory laws dealing with electrical power, and discriminatory laws.201
Three investment agreements limit stabilization to fiscal issues: a
water privatization project, a power project, and an extractive industry
project.2 02 Other variations on these kinds of equilibrium clauses include "a
road contract that stabilizes economic status for all laws except inflationary
tax law changes," and a "power contract that explicitly covers only changes
in environmental law and tax and fiscal issues. Many stabilization
clauses cover laws with general applicability like minimum wage,
employment and labor laws, and health and safety laws. 204 "None of the
non-OECD contracts offers an explicit risk-sharing approach for specific
changes in law (targeting the industry) that chanie project requirements,
where the risk cannot be passed on to third parties.'
ii. Threshold Loss Limits
Of the twenty-two limited economic equilibrium clauses in place
between investors and non-OECD states, seven (six power projects and one
road project) stabilized all laws but imposed a threshold economic loss
requirement on the project before triggering adjustments or
200 Shemberg, supra note 27, 1 104, at 30. Limited economic equilibrium clauses from
the OECD contracts in the study generally limit stabilization coverage to laws that are
discriminatory toward the investor, and in some cases offer risk-sharing or compensation for
specific laws pertaining to the sector or project. Laws for public policy issues such as safety
and security, even if discriminatory toward the investor, often are explicitly excluded from
stabilization. Id. 88, 96.
201 Id 1107.
202 Id l1.
203 id.
204 Id. 113.
205 id,
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206
compensation. These threshold requirements limit the applicability of
the stabilization clause, but operate without regard to the nature of the
issue-area in which the change in law occurs. "In these contracts it
doesn't matter whether the change in law is foreseeable, or whether it is a
law of general applicability, specific applicability, or for a public policy
purpose."208
Investment agreements may also impose thresholds of materiality
before compensation or adjustment is required or may leave the standard for
compensation to the customary international law norm for a regulatory
taking.2 09
iii. Foreseeability
Some limited economic equilibrium clauses in contracts between
investors and host states stabilize "foreseeable" changes in laws. 210 Two
sample contracts provide stabilization coverafe for foreseeable laws that are
already passed, but yet to be in force.2 ' Other contracts are more
encompassing, stabilizing all unforeseeable changes in law except for tax
changes.2 1 2 In one instance, the parties stabilized laws in force as of years
before the contract date.21
iv. Discriminatory Effect
Of the limited economic equilibrium clauses in the study between
foreign investors and a non-OECD state, only two limit stabilization
206 Id. 1 105.
207 id
208 id
209 Cotula supra note 28, at 166-67 ("Overall, the case law suggests that a regulatory
taking only occurs when regulation entails 'substantial' deprivation of property rights that is
such to render these rights economically 'useless,' as evidenced by criteria such as control
over the investment, or interference with day-to-day management or with payment of
dividends."). See also Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Award on the
Merits of Phase 2, T 100 (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Award Merits-e.pdf.
210 Shemberg, supra note 27, 109, at 31.
211 Id. ("One is a Latin American power contract that covers all laws, except income tax,
but includes enacted laws not yet in force. Similarly, a road contract for South Asia covers
all laws, including those known at the time of the contract but not yet in force.").
212 Id. 108.
213 Id. 110 ("The first contract for the project dates from the 1990s and provides
economic equilibrium for all environmental law changes having an economic impact after
one year prior to its signature. The 2000s contract maintains the original reference date of
the 1990s contract for environmental changes in law in its equilibrium clause. This means
that pursuant to the later contract, the investor is entitled to adjustments in the contract or
compensation for all changes to environmental laws that make greater requirements than
those in force 10 years prior, even if a foreseeable change in environmental law in the 2000s
would differ from what was foreseeable in the 1990s.").
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coverage based strictly on discriminatory or arbitrary actions by the
government, the standard under customary international law discussed
above. 214 For example, one Latin American transportation project contract
permits stabilization protection only where the law: (1) is onerous and
highly unusual in the industry internationally; (2) affects the costs of the
foreign investor so as to "substantially prevent it from carrying on a
significant part of its business"; and (3) revents the foreign investor from
meeting its senior debt requirements.2 1  Even then, "adjustments can be
made to the contract only as needed to make the senior debt payments."2 16
V. EFFICIENT CONTRACTING BETWEEN STATES AND
INVESTORS
As the analysis above reveals, host states and foreign investors appear
to demonstrate the contracting efficiencies predicted under generally
accepted economic theory. The analysis also answers one of the puzzles
arising in one prominent study conducted by Zach Elkins, Andrew Guzman
and Beth Simmons. They predicted followers of the "obsolescing bargain"
school would expect investors in the extractive industries to demand BITs,
but they found that "dependence on extractive industries reduced the
probability that a host would make such a commitment." 2 17 The analysis
above suggests that investors in the extractive industries are more likely to
demand detailed contracts to govern their investments, not BITs. This is
not inconsistent with Elkins', Guzman's, and Simmons' finding that a high
number of "manufacturing" host states signed BITs. The wish to signal
openness to garment retailers, for example, may play a role in why a
developing country signs a BIT, but the Coase-Williamson theory would
predict investors in light manufacturing would probably not "demand"
BITs, as the sheer competition between manufacturers in several states
would make supplier-shopping relatively inexpensive. BITs would have a
marginal or negligible effect.
So, if investors and states generally construct effective mechanisms
like stabilization clauses to economize on bounded rationality and
opportunism, what explains BITs? It might be argued, first, that it is the
proliferation of BITs that has facilitated the entry of foreign investors into
new markets. Therefore, stabilization clauses represent marginal benefits
arising from BITs which, in any case, are better at promoting foreign direct
218investment. A related argument might be that an underlying BIT
operated as a default regime for negotiating the contract. The parties
contracted in the shadow of the BIT just as parties might contract in the
214 Id. 112.
215 id.
216 id.
217 Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 843.
218 Schill, supra note 43, at 23.
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shadow of local law.
First, the Shemberg Study does not give us insight as to whether any
given contracting relationship was also supported by a BIT, so it is not
possible to investigate that assertion, at least with respect to analyzing the
influence of a BIT on an investment agreement negotiation.2 19 Second, it is
reasonable to assume an investor is far more aware of a contract it is
directly negotiating than the presence of a BIT (or even a regional
investment treaty). 0 The limited evidence shows investors, from small to
very large, are often unaware, ex ante, of BITs or the protections they might
provide. Third, stabilization clauses pre-date the modem explosion of BITs
and, in the case of freezing clauses, appear to have moved through the
1990s and 2000s in more-or-less the same form as they read before.2 2 1
Furthermore, a great deal of evidence suggests the primary consideration
influencing a decision to invest is the size of the target market. 222 If it is
true that companies are anxious to be "first-movers" in sectors of promising
economies like Argentina, Mexico, Thailand, or Egypt, it is probably not
true as a general matter that "the rational and risk-adverse investor will
choose not to invest at all or only invest at a higher premium that takes into
account the potential risk of the host State reneging on its original
,,223promise.
Lastly, evidence that BITs displace or undermine contracting is limited
and mixed. While Exxon invested in the Orinoco Belt beginning in the
1990s, it did not house its investment in a Dutch holding company until
February 2006, after the Chavez administration declared thirty-two
investment agreements illegal under a revised 2001 hydrocarbons law.224
ConocoPhillips also established a Dutch holding company for its operations
in the Orinoco Belt and both are resorting to ICSID arbitration instead of
renegotiating pursuant to their international investment agreements. Italian
energy company ENI, on the other hand, also invests in Venezuela through
219 The authors of the study are bound by confidentiality agreements even if they knew
more about the contracts (including the parties) which in many cases they did not.
220 Franck, supra note 50, at 364.
221 Shemberg, supra note 27, 26, at 6-7.
222 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN
THE MID-1990s, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998); see
Mary Hallward-Driemeier, World Bank, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI?
Only a Bit.. and They Could Bite (June 2003), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/
docserver/download/3121.pdfexpires=1299043967&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=15
33EFC78091AE5A951658478E593FCO; see also Vahe Lskavyan & Mariana Spatareanu,
Host Country's Governance and the Size of Foreign Investors, 100 EcoN. LETTERS 258
(2008).
223 Schill, supra note 43.
224 Emily A. Witten, Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing Strategy?, 4 TEx.
J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 55, 56-57 (2008); ICSID Admits Exxon's Charges Against
Venezuela from 2006 Only, EL UNIVERSAL, June 11, 2010, http://english.eluniversal.com/
2010/06/1 1/en-eco-esp icsid-admits-exxons_11 A4003971.shtml.
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a Dutch holding company, but renegotiated its investment as contemplated
by the stabilization clause. At the very least, these factors suggest BITs are
not facilitating efficient stabilization clauses.
It might also be argued economic equilibrium clauses are newer than
freezing clauses, which are a relic of pre-nationalization, post-colonial
dominance by large investors.225 According to the Shemberg Study,
however, it appears freezing clauses are still widely used in recent
agreements, which surprised many of the lawyers who participated in the
study.226 Even for those agreements where "path dependence" leads large
law firms in the United States and Europe to include stabilization clauses
because they have been inherited from form contracts, the diversity of
institutional design suggests parties engage in bargaining over multiple
aspects of the stabilization clause.
A. BITs as a Barrier to Efficient Contracting
In some circumstances, an investor who is aware of BITs may view
stabilization clauses, even economic equilibrium clauses, as threats to the
more generous terms offered by BITs; in other circumstances, an investor
may reorganize its corporate structure to avail itself of a BIT that
undermines the purpose of the stabilization clause. If the terms of a BIT
provide for compensating an investor for changes in the law resulting in
indirect expropriation, but do not conversely provide for sharing of
windfalls with the government, the incentive is to rely on the vaguer and
broader promises contained within the BIT. As one practitioner noted,
while his law firm may inherit a freezing clause from a model contract, this
inherited clause may not best secure the client's interest with respect to
future changes in a host state's law. This is instead accomplished by
identifying and availing itself of the most favorable terms under a BIT,
often using the Netherlands or Switzerland (the determination of which is
affected by tax and other regulatory implications).227 While there is some
precedent to suggest a tribunal may require authorizing language from a
stabilization clause before issuing an award,22 8 substantial inconsistency in
225 See, e.g., REX J. ZEDALIS, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF OIL AND GAS IN IRAQ: CURRENT
REALITY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 4-8 (2009) (detailing the history of British, Dutch and
French company concessions in the area now known as Iraq dating from 1911).
226 Shemberg, supra note 27, 1 25, at 6. In the author's view, one reason for the
discrepancy may be that the expressed views came from leading large law firms whose
practices are not necessarily representative of modem contract practice generally.
227 Interview with practicing attorney who spoke on condition of anonymity (July 7,
2010).
228 See Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Compagnie Generale des Eaux v.
Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, 56-61, 96 (ICSID 2000), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docld=DC548En&caseld=C159 (distinguishing a breach of the BIT and a breach of
contract). According to Laura Henry, "The overwhelming majority of cases have held that
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existing decisions and unpredictability for future decisions casts doubt on
whether the existence of a stabilization clause alone can guard against
challenges based on one or more BITs. 2 29 As one practitioner noted with
respect to clients in the petroleum sector: "[tlhis mechanism [launching an
investor-state claim under a BIT] is available regardless of whether the
investor already has a contractual or arbitration arrangement with the host
state or with one of its governmental entities." 23 0
Even lengthier BITs, those covering a greater number of investors and
investments with greater specificity, are unlikely to obtain the same level of
risk distribution as investment agreements. First, investors shop for the
home state whose BITs offer the greatest benefits for a single transaction or
broader operations. 2 31  Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips are currently
BIT Tribunals will not have jurisdiction over a contract claim between a State and an alien
unless the government's conduct at the time of the contractual breach also breached a
substantive obligation under the treaty." Investment Agreement Claims Under the 2004
Model U.S. BIT: A Challenge for State Police Powers?, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 935, 962
(2010). See also Thomas J. Pate, Evaluating Stabilization Clauses in Venezuela's Strategic
Association Agreements for Heavy-Crude Extraction in the Orinoco Belt: The Return of a
Forgotten Contractual Risk Reduction Mechanism for the Petroleum Industry, 40 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv. 347, 362 (2008-2009) (citing MCI Power Group v. Ecuador, "[o]ne can
only assume that had the investor had the desire and leverage to memorialize its expectations
in a well-drafted stabilization clause, the tribunal may have reached a different result.");
Parkerings-Compagniet v. Republic of Lith. Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 332 (ICSID
2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC682_En&caseld=C252 ("Save for the existence of an
agreement, in the form of a stabilization clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable
about the amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an investor
made its investment."); Duke Energy Int'l Peru Inv. Ltd. 1 v. Republic of Peru, Case No.
ARB/03/28, Award (ICSID 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Duke
EnergyPeruAward_000.pdf (enforcing tax stabilization provisions).
229 El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on
Jurisdiction, f 84-88 (ICSID 2006), reprinted in 21 ICSID Rev. (2006) (determining that
the umbrella clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT does not extend the Treaty protection to
breaches of an ordinary commercial contract entered into by the State or a State-owned
entity, but will cover additional investment protections contractually agreed by the State as a
sovereign, such as a stabilization clause inserted into an investment agreement). However,
there is no doubt that if the State interferes with contractual rights by a unilateral act,
whether these rights stem from a contract entered into by a foreign investor with a private
party, a State autonomous entity or the State itself, in such a way that the State's action can
be analyzed as a violation of the standards of protection embodied in a BIT, the treaty-based
arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction over all the claims of the foreign investor, including the
claims arising from a violation of its contractual rights.
230 John W. Boscariol, Foreign Investment Protection Treaties: Opportunities in the
Petroleum Industry, 44 ALTA. L. REv. 115, 141 (2006).
231 See Robert E. Greig et al., How Bilateral Investment Treaties Can Protect Foreign
Investors in the Arab World or Arab Investors Abroad, 25 J. INT'L ARB 257, 259, 272 (2008)
(giving the example of the United Arab Emirates-France BIT, which protects corporations
that are directly and indirectly controlled by French nationals or economic entities); Ranjan,
supra note 8, at 221 (citing Fedax v. Venezuela, July 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998) in
which holders of promissory notes who were not entitled to investment protection transferred
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232
engaged in arbitration with Venezuela through Dutch holding companies.
Philip Morris International moved its operations from the U.S. to
Switzerland in 2008, organizing its ownership structure to favor Swiss
corporate vehicles and permitting it to take advantage of Switzerland's vast
network of short, pro-investor BITs. Second, investors argue the "most
favored nation" provisions in many BITs allow them to use the most
favorable procedural and substantive provisions of other BITs with that host
state.233 As Kenneth Vandevelde concluded:
In effect, BITs allow host states complete discretion either to exclude
foreign investment or to admit it only conditionally, but then they
place major restrictions on the ability of the host state to regulate
foreign investment once established .... To the extent that they
require reliance upon exclusion rather than regulation of foreign
investments, BITs appear to adopt the least economically desirable
means of addressing macroeconomic concerns; just as they choose
the least economically desirable means of addressing the
234
microeconomic concerns.
Whether BITs actually deter the formation of more complete contracts
is unclear.23 5 One measure might be whether the proliferation of BITs has
had a deterrent effect on the use of stabilization clauses, a proposition for
which there is, at best, anecdotal support.2 36 It is impossible to definitively
conclude stabilization clauses are declining in use; it is likewise impossible
to conclude they are increasing.237
the notes to a Dutch company which then enabled treaty protection); Van Harten, supra note
1, at 29 (describing how a domestic business can bring a claim under a BIT by making itself
"foreign" by establishing a holding company in the foreign country (citing South African
and Pakistani reservations about BITs concluded in the 1990s (citing Tokios Tokeles v. Ukr.
20 ICSID Rev. 205 (2005)))).
232 At least one international arbitration tribunal has permitted a domestic company to
become "foreign" by setting up a holding company in a neighboring state. Tokios Tokeles v.
Ukr., 20 ICSID Rev. 205 (2005).
233 Yannick Radi, The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute
Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the 'Trojan Horse',
18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 758, 759 (2007).
234 Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 119, at 493.
235 This is in part because the "market for dispute resolution" is less developed at the
international level than domestically. See Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and
the Limits of the New Formalism, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1 (2009) (arguing that transactors
choose dispute resolution forums based in part on a preference for formal versus contextual
interpretation). The certainty and predictability associated with domestic courts or tribunals
adjudicating commercial disputes is significantly reduced at the level of international
investment disputes.
236 PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 497 (1995).
237 Scholars like the late Thomas Wfielde and Lorenzo Cotula do contend that their use is
increasing, although it appears that those assertions are supported by impressions rather than
evidence.
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A second measure may be how investors or their lawyers weigh BITs
and investment agreements. One international arbitrator argued investor-
state contracts are only available to "investors with sufficient negotiating
power," although it is unclear from the available evidence if this is so. 2 38 A
survey of large Swiss enterprises concluded that investment decisions are
made regardless of whether a BIT is in place or not (Switzerland has signed
at least 113 BITs). 23 9 Small and medium enterprises-constituencies for
which international arbitrators, practitioners, scholars and even critics agree
should be the beneficiaries of BITs-showed marginally greater reliance on
BITs, but also confirmed they invested in countries without a BIT. 240
Investment decisions are based on factors including political stability, the
availability of inexpensive labor or natural resources, and the size of the
domestic market. There is little (and disputed) evidence BITs result in
increased investment. 241  The size of the target market is apparently the
factor that best explains decisions to invest.
B. BITs as Instruments of State Power
If it is true (1) investors and states demonstrate efficient contracting
behavior and (2) BITs may, under some circumstances, diminish the
incentives to negotiate appropriate political risk between parties, then the
explanation for the proliferation of BITs may lie in the origins of BITs
themselves: competition between developed countries to achieve both
political and economic objectives.2 43 There are good reasons to believe this
is so.
First, the web of BITs appears to reflect the overall distribution of
power in the international system. In the vast majority of cases,
industrialized countries initiate the formation of investment treaties with
developing countries.2 " As one prominent scholar of BITs observed, "If
[host governments'] collaboration is required-as it is for public (national
238 See Brower & Schill, supra note 6. In one survey of Swiss corporate executives,
investor-state contracts are rated with the same importance for safeguarding investments as
public investment guarantees and private insurance and only slightly lower than BITs.
Jentsch, supra note 23.
239 Id. at 1, 20.
240 See Brower & Schill, supra note 6, at 481-82; Schill, supra note 43, at 29; Yackee,
International Investment Law, supra note 72, at 125; see generally Jentsch, supra note 22, at
10, 17,19,21.
241 Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 6, at 625-26; see Franck,
supra note 50, at 348; Jentsch, supra note 22, at 25.
242 See, e.g., V.N. BALASUBRANYAM, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: DETERMINANTS AND IMPACT (2001).
243 Philip Moremen, Private Rights ofAction to Enforce Rules of International Regimes,
79 TEMP. L. REV. 1127, 1159 (2006); Vandevelde, supra note 120, at 473; see Yackee,
Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 2, at 406.
244 SALACUSE, supra note 21.
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and international) risk insurance or for bilateral investment treaties-it is
usually given reluctantly, under pressure, and with the promise of major
investment forthcoming." 245 Stiglitz notes, "[i]n practice, [BITs] are part of
the demands developed countries impose on developing countries, often as
part of trade agreements, acceded to by developing countries.. ."246 Once
a country like the Netherlands or Switzerland has decided it wants to
formalize protection for its companies and nationals, it develops a model
treaty which will serve as a starting point for all negotiations. In forming a
model treaty, a government will consult all interested governmental and
private sector parties to form a national position.247 The model determines
the agenda and sets the framework for negotiations, and therefore gives the
creator an advantage in the negotiations. The developing countries that
do best in negotiations are unsurprisingly the larger and more powerful
ones. For example, India and China both have model BITs that make BIT
provisions "subject to or in accordance with national laws"-a feature not
shared by other, arguably less influential, host states. 249 Brazil tends not to
enter into BITs at all. 250 Evidently it is not the case that "developing states
almost rush to conclude [BITs] .. 251
Second, the history of BITs appears to reflect global competition
between developed countries. The United States initiated its BIT program
after "repeated calls from Congress and the U.S. business community for a
U.S. investment treaty program similar to European programs," calls
reflecting their fears that U.S. investors were losing the global race to open
new markets.25 2 The United States entered negotiations for an FTA (with
an investment chapter) with South Korea, manifesting a desire to keep pace
with the European Union, which has already concluded a trade treaty with
South Korea. 25 Switzerland competes with other European countries to
245 Waelde & Ndi, supra note 28, at 237.
246 Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 491. Stiglitz explains that developing countries agree to BITs
"because the cost to the developing country is less than the surplus they believe they will
receive as a result of the trade deal." Unfortunately, this determination is often made by a
limited set of government officials, excluding representatives from key ministries like health
and environment whose input may change the calculation.
247 Interview with Mark Kantor, Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center, in Washington D.C. (Jun. 29, 2010); see also Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-up
International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School ofInternational Law, 32
YALE J. INT'L L. 393, 398-408 (2007) (describing the bottom-up lawmaking process).
248 Interview with Mark Kantor, supra note 247.
249 Ranjan, supra note 8, at 230. Bangladesh, for example, has this clause in only three
of fifteen BITs while Pakistan has it in twenty-eight of thirty-one.
250 See Jonathan Hamilton, Brazil's BIT Dilemma, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Dec. 17, 2009.
251 Ratner, supra note 18, at 516.
252 Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 6, at 625.
253 WILLIAM H. COOPER ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE PROPOSED U.S.-
SOUTH KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (KORUS FTA): PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 3
(2010) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34330.pdf.
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host the international operations of multiple industries; an extensive
network of BITs is one of many factors that might tip the balance in its
favor.254
Third, BITs are negotiated in close connection with foreign policy
objectives. As Alvarez notes, "states have a multitude of reasons for
entering into international obligations-from the political to the highly
legalistic."255 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States viewed
BITs as a way to support its objectives in Eastern Europe where it focused
most of its early attention.256 Similar diplomatic andpolitical influences
drove U.S. overtures toward Colombia and Rwanda. While the United
States uses BITs and the investment chapters of FTAs in close connection
with foreign policy objectives, 258 Switzerland's objective appears driven by
the principle of opening up developing world economies to its investors.
As the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs stated in an interview, the
goal of the ministry is to sign a BIT with every non-OECD country.2 59
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued the presence of stabilization clauses in
contracts between investors and host states provides some evidence that
these parties demonstrate efficient contracting behavior. While more
research is required in order to fully understand the relationship between
stabilization clauses and investment treaties, certain factors, including
investor awareness of BITs, suggest investment treaties are often
unnecessary and may erode the efficiencies achieved through stabilization
clauses. 260  If BITs are not efficiency-enhancing mechanisms promoting
investment, they may be, as critics argue, economically unjustified
subsidies imposed upon developing countries as part of a global
254 Deborah Ball & Cassell Bryan-Low, Swiss Tax Play Lures Business, WALL ST. J.,
(Feb. 2, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034229045750394310122
72688.html.
255 Alvarez, supra note 42, at 41.
256 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, in
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOws 3, 25-26 (Karl P. Sauvant
& Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
257 Interview with Mark Kantor, Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center, in Washington D.C. (Jun. 29, 2010). There are four departments that assist in trade
treaty negotiations: the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the State
Department, the Department of Commerce, and the Treasury Department. Each department
is usually physically represented at negotiations as well.
258 See Yackee, Empirical Study ofBilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 2, at 462.
259 Jentsch, supra note 23, at 12 (citing an interview with the Swiss State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs. Switzerland's objective is to "sign a BIT with all countries that are not
members of OECD . .. almost every day companies having problems with host governments
call SECO in order to negotiate with the foreign state.").
260 Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 489.
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competition for new markets and new capital. That developing countries
sign BITs in order to compete in sectors like light manufacturing may be
only a small part of the story.261
The future of BITs is uncertain. Many commentators suggest that, as
developing countries like the BRICs become great powers, the number will
increase. However, Pakistan, South Africa, and Venezuela have reecntly
exhibited an interest in terminating or renegotiating BITs.263  Even if
investors ultimately demand BITs as their primary investment protection,
this Article may lay the groundwork for better negotiations at the BIT
level.2 6 States may, for example, include historically excluded
constituencies at negotiations, like representatives from Ministries of Health
or Environment, as investors frequently target their administrative
measures.265 Principles from economic equilibrium clauses including
exemptions for environment, health, and labor laws also may be
incorporated into the broader language of BITs with more specificity than
"non-precluded measures" clauses now provide. Currently, many BITs
place health and safety provisions in ambiguous preamble statements or
261 Contra Ratner, supra note 18, at 483 ("The best evidence of this general coherence is
simply that the outputs of the decision-making processes form a general, albeit not uniform,
pattern-that the bulk of claims of regulatory takings are rejected, typically because (1) the
investor is found not to have a legitimate expectation of property right in what he claims was
taken from him; (2) the governmental measure does not have the requisite severe impact on
his control of the investment; or (3) the purpose and contours of the measure appear to place
a fair burden on the investor compared to the public as a whole.").
262 Alvarez, supra note 42, at 23-24.
263 Andrea Carska-Sheppard, Issues Relevant to the Termination of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 26 J. OF INT'L ARB. 755, 755-71 (2009); Van Harten, supra note 1, at 23-24.
264 Robert E. Greig, Claudia Annacker, & Roland Ziade, How Bilateral Investment
Treaties Can Protect Foreign Investors in the Arab World or Arab Investors Abroad, 25 J.
OF INT'L ARB. 257, 259 (2008) (noting that renegotiations have mainly occurred with Egypt
and Morocco).
265 Van Harten, supra note 1, at 45-46 ("There are reports of investment treaties being
signed as photo opportunities .. . there was little evidence in the early 2000s when [Pakistan]
faced its first BIT claim, that ministries in the Pakistani government (beyond the one that had
signed them) were aware of the country's BITs and that he was unable to uncover any
records demonstrating meaningful participation by Pakistan in the BIT negotiations.");
Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Reflections on Pakistan's investment
treaty program after 50 years; an interview with the former attorney general of Pakistan,
Makhdoom Ali Khan, INV. TREATY NEWS (Apr. 2009); Press Release, Embassy of the United
States, U.S.-Pakistan Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations (May 12, 2005), available at
http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h0505l203.html. Pakistan's negotiating team
consisted of the Secretary of the Pakistani Board of Investment (head), and representatives of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industries and Production,
Ministry of Commerce, Central Board of Revenue, and State Bank of Pakistan. Uruguay's
negotiating team consisted of representatives from its Ministry of Economy and Finance, its
Ambassador to the United States, and its Foreign Minister. See Press Release, Embassy of
Uruguay, United States - Uruguay Conclude Bilateral Investment Treaty (Sept. 7, 2004),
available at http://www.uruwashi.org/Archive%202004.htm#Embassy%20Press%20
Releases%202004.
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couch them in non-binding terms.266
More certain is that the current literature on BITs does not sufficiently
discuss the full range of issues on which existing evidence might provide
insight, including how the mobility of capital shapes competition between
states and basic aspects of domestic corporate law; the nuances lurking
behind and within BITs not reflected by their aggregate numbers; and the
complicated interactions between politics, diplomacy, and investment.
Further consideration is therefore necessary to understand more fully the
role BITs play in growth and development.
312
266 See Yelpaala, supra note 39, at 241 (noting that many health and safety provisions are
located in the preamble or couched in non-binding terms); see also Yackee, Empirical Study
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 2, at 423-27 (describing how some variations of
pre-consents are less binding than others).
